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THE INSTITUTIONAL APPETITE FOR 
“QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” 
Alicia J. Davis 
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal 
corporate governance is associated with higher levels of 
ownership by institutional investors. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason 
than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but 
surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts 
doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The 
study described in this Article also finds that higher quality 
external governance is associated with lower proportions of 
ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a 
somewhat surprising result given available empirical 
evidence on the positive relationship between external 
governance and firm performance. After largely dismissing 
 
   Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful 
conversations and comments on prior drafts and this paper’s predecessor, I 
thank Steve Choi, John DiNardo, Mitu Gulati, Todd Henderson, Don 
Herzog, Jim Hines, Vic Khanna, Saul Levmore, Nina Mendelson, Martha 
Nussbaum, JJ Prescott, Adam Pritchard, Veronica Santarosa, Sonja Starr, 
Brady West and participants at the Annual Meeting of the American Law 
and Economics Association, the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 
the University of Chicago Law School’s Best Ideas lecture series, the 
University of Michigan Law School Law and Economics Workshop, the 
University of Michigan Fawley lunch, and the University of Michigan 
Business Law Lunch. For research assistance, I thank Grady Bridges, 
Jesse Hogin, and Zachary Klausner, and for technical and administrative 
assistance, I thank Stephen Fuller and Karen Rushlow. For statistical 
consulting services on an earlier, related project, I am indebted to Ed 
Rothman and Heidi Reichert of the University of Michigan’s Center for 
Statistical Consultation and Research. I also thank Paul Michaud and 
Kyle Schroeder for computer and technical assistance and Michael 
Ellenbogen, Anthony Rubin, and Caryn Smith for research assistance on 
an earlier, related project. Any errors are my own. The Cook Fund of the 
University of Michigan Law School and the Walter V. Schaefer Fund at 
the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support for this 
project. 
DAVIS – FINAL  
2 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
competing explanations for these findings, I conclude that 
institutional investors, as a group, generally prefer internal 
governance mechanisms over external governance 
mechanisms or have a higher tolerance for low-quality 
external governance than for low-quality internal governance. 
I argue that these preferences are reasonable and suggest that 
when debating the efficacy of governance mechanisms, the 
preferences of informed, sophisticated investors be afforded 
greater weight than is currently the case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reading much of the legal scholarship from the last 
decade on U.S. corporate governance would leave one with 
the definite impression that the laws in the area are 
arbitrary and run counter to the evidence on the appropriate 
regulation of business activity. For example, ten years ago, 
Professor Roberta Romano roundly panned The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “SOX”), which was passed by 
Congress in the wake of large-scale accounting fraud 
scandals.1 According to Professor Romano, empirical 
research on the substantive corporate governance mandates 
of Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrated that the required 
governance devices, including a mandate for all public 
companies to have 100% independent audit committees, 
would neither address the problem of accounting fraud nor 
increase firm value. This observation led Professor Romano 
to charge Congress with engaging in “quack corporate 
governance,” i.e., legislating without regard to the relevant 
empirical research. 
This charge was echoed by others in the academy2 and 
later applied to the governance mandates in The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”), Congress’ response to the 2008 financial crisis. In a 
piece titled “Dodd Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II,” Professor Stephen Bainbridge echoes 
the criticism leveled by Professor Romano against Sarbanes-
Oxley and argues that Dodd-Frank’s governance mandates, 
including a requirement for all public companies to have 
fully independent compensation committees, have no basis in 
empirical research.3 
The corporate governance “quackery” label has found 
application beyond Congressional legislation. Commercial 
 
1 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
2 See infra Part II.A. 
3 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1805 (2011). 
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service providers, such as proxy advisory firm Institutional 
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), have developed metrics to 
assess the strength of corporate governance practices, and 
these metrics are now in widespread use by large, 
sophisticated investors. Professor Paul Rose argues that the 
corporate governance ratings touted by proxy advisory firms 
lack empirical support, as there is little evidence of a 
relationship between the governance practices encouraged by 
the ratings system and increases in firm valuation.4 He is far 
from alone in his criticism.5 
What the corporate governance provisions of SOX and 
Dodd-Frank and corporate governance ratings have in 
common is either an exclusive (in the case of SOX and Dodd-
Frank) or predominate (in the case of governance ratings) 
focus on internal governance mechanisms––those things that 
relate to how the corporation is managed internally (e.g., 
independence of the board of directors). Very little is known 
about what works in corporate governance, and the empirical 
evidence on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms 
is mixed, at best. Therefore, those academics critical of SOX, 
Dodd-Frank, and corporate governance ratings have 
understandably seized on the bevy of research that fails to 
show consistent relationships between internal governance 
quality and firm value.  
Many reasons for Congress’ purportedly wrong-headed 
focus on internal governance mechanisms in the 
promulgation of SOX and Dodd-Frank have been offered. 
These reasons relate to the vagaries of politics, the pressure 
that comes from legislating in times of crisis, and limited 
Congressional capacity to critically evaluate empirical 
research.6 Similarly, pecuniary incentives have been 
proffered as the reason behind the commercial corporate 
governance industry’s interest in selling corporate 
governance ratings without regard to whether there is solid 
empirical evidence to suggest that the governance 
 
4 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 
887, 910, 912, 914 (2007). 
5 See infra Part II.B. 
6 See infra Part II.A. 
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mechanisms encouraged by the ratings systems improve 
corporate performance.7 The basic claim of the critics is that 
governance devices of, at best, questionable efficacy have 
been thrust upon the business community, either by 
legislative fiat or ratings pressure, to the detriment of firm 
value. 
In stark contrast to the prevailing views on internal 
corporate governance, academics are largely united in their 
belief in the effectiveness of external governance––firm 
characteristics that maximize vulnerability to hostile 
takeovers (e.g., lack of a poison pill or classified board)8––in 
enhancing shareholder value. The received wisdom in the 
academy is that the only form of “effective governance” 
documented in the research literature is external corporate 
governance.9 Proponents of high-quality external governance 
assert that takeovers in the “market for corporate control” 
create value for shareholders,10 and Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk, for example, is leading the charge (and drawing the 
ire of prominent advocates of director primacy)11 to enhance 
shareholder power through the strengthening of external 
governance. 
The line of demarcation between internal and external 
governance is not fixed, of course. There is an overlap 
between the two categories, and the two purportedly 
different types of governance mechanisms sometimes rely on 
one another for effectiveness.12 Indeed, there is evidence that 
external and internal governance are complements (i.e., 
exposure to the market for corporate control is only effective 
 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
8 See infra Part II.C. for the definitions of a poison pill and a classified 
(i.e., staggered) board. 
9 See infra Part II.C. 
10 See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of this point. 
11 See Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the 
Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Company, Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz (Feb. 22, 2013), in ACTIVIST REP. 4 (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://hl.com/email/pdf/the-activist-report-april2013.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N834-LVK2. 
12 David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 147, 150–51 (2011). 
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if there is strong internal governance in the form of a large 
monitoring stockholder that can facilitate a takeover).13 That 
said, researchers tend to think about types of governance 
devices that are internal to an organization separately from 
those mechanisms that serve to either facilitate or impede 
third-party takeover attempts. 
In light of the evidence on the efficacy of various 
governance practices, Professor Jonathan Macey argues that 
a regulatory paradox exists. He argues that Congress, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and the 
highly influential proxy advisory firms who promulgate 
commercial ratings promote internal governance 
mechanisms, which have not proven effective, while 
Congress, state legislatures, and courts not only fail to 
promote a robust market for corporate control, but also 
impede its effectiveness by sanctioning both the 
implementation of antitakeover mechanisms and their 
maintenance in the face of a hostile bid.14 
There have been thousands of law review articles written 
about corporate governance in the past ten years.15 It is fair 
to say that the motivations and preferences of legislators, 
academics, courts, and, even to some extent, commercial 
governance ratings agencies have been thoroughly explored. 
 
13 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance 
Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2860 (2005); infra Part II. 
14 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 46 (2008). 
15 A Westlaw search for law review articles published between March 
16, 2005, and March 15, 2015, with the term “corporate governance” in the 
title returns 442 results. Westlaw Search with “Corporate Governance” in 
the Title, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com (last visited Mar. 23, 
2015) (search for “advanced: (TITLE(“corporate governance”)) & DA(aft 03-
15-2005 & bef 03-16-2015),” filter for “Secondary Sources” then “Law 
Reviews & Journals”). The same search for law review articles with the 
term “corporate governance” appearing at least five times anywhere in the 
document yields 2,845 results. Westlaw Search with “Corporate 
Governance” at Least Five Times, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (search for “advanced: (ATLEAST5(“corporate 
governance”)) & DA(aft 03-15-2005 & bef 03-16-2015),” filter for 
“Secondary Sources” then “Law Reviews & Journals”). These results do not 
include articles written in finance or other business journals on this topic. 
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What is missing from the empirical corporate governance 
literature is a comprehensive, detailed review of the 
governance preferences of an important constituency––
investors. The relationship between institutional ownership 
and governance has been explored previously. For example, 
Professors Kee Chung and Hao Zhang show that higher 
proportions of institutional ownership are associated with 
higher governance quality as measured by fifty governance 
characteristics derived from ISS’ corporate governance 
database.16 Professors Brian Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter and 
Joseph Gerakos find little evidence of any association 
between corporate governance and institutional ownership 
overall, but do find that a subset of what they term 
“governance sensitive” institutions exhibits preferences for 
certain types of governance mechanisms.17 However, none of 
the previously produced studies explore the internal/external 
governance dichotomy or attempt to ascertain whether 
institutions generally or particular types of institutions 
prefer certain governance mechanisms to others. This paper 
is, to my knowledge, the first to do so. 
This omission from the literature is odd since Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank were designed to “restore investor 
confidence” and “protect investors” following substantial 
lapses in corporate governance.18 Gaining an understanding 
of the specific governance preferences of the “protected class” 
makes sense. Of course, if the protected class is uninformed 
or incapable of understanding what is in its best interests, 
and one is apt to adopt a paternalistic approach to 
regulation, then one might pay scant attention to the 
 
16 Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Corporate Governance and 
Institutional Ownership, 46 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 247, 269–70 
(2011). 
17 Brian J. Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter & Joseph Gerakos, 
Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms, J. 
MGMT. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 3). 
18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002); Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 7, 45, 61 (2005) (testimony of Hon. William H. 
Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
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preferences of the protected class. However, if there is a 
group within the protected class that has reason to prefer 
well-governed firms and that is capable of assessing the 
value of governance practices, then understanding its 
preferences can help inform policy debates. With respect to 
corporate governance, such a group exists––namely, 
sophisticated institutional investors. 
Most retail (individual) investors, given their small 
investment stakes, rationally opt not to expend time, effort, 
and money monitoring the corporate governance practices of 
the firms in which they invest.19 On the other hand, 
 
19 A number of researchers have provided reasons for why retail 
investors care less about corporate governance than institutional 
investors. For example, Professors Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, in 
describing the free-rider problem, note that it is not cost effective for small 
shareholders to monitor management. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. 
Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 42 (1980). Evidence supports the view 
that retail investors are generally passive with respect to governance 
matters. Not only are there few reported instances of retail investors 
waging activist campaigns to force governance changes, but individual 
investors also vote in corporate elections at a low rate. The percentage of 
retail investors participating in routine corporate elections is estimated to 
be approximately 20% on average and is as low as 5% at some firms. 
Frank G. Zarb, Jr., Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case For 
“Client Directed Voting,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (Feb. 14, 2010, 8:39 AM), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2010/02/14/restoring-balance-in-proxy-voting-the-case-for-client-directed-
voting/, archived at http://perma.cc/3RMA-JXNV. Therefore, individual 
investors are largely believed to focus less on corporate governance than 
institutions do. However, despite the hypotheses set forth by researchers 
and the voting evidence, survey evidence calls into question the notion 
that individual investors are largely indifferent to corporate governance. 
Professors Jeffrey Cohen, Lori Holder-Webb, Leda Nath, and David Wood 
surveyed 750 retail investors and asked them questions about the types of 
non-financial information they use when making investment (buy-sell) 
decisions. Not surprisingly, retail investors used non-financial information 
directly related to economic performance the most, with over 60% of those 
surveyed indicating that, for example, they frequently use information on 
market share and product innovation. However, a substantial percentage 
of respondents (ranging anywhere from approximately 38% for board 
selection processes to 52% for executive compensation) also revealed that 
they frequently use various types of corporate governance information 
DAVIS – FINAL  
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institutional investors, because of their relatively larger 
stakes, have more incentive to monitor, particularly if it is 
costly to exit.20 Since owning shares in a well-governed firm 
reduces an investor’s own monitoring costs, such investments 
are attractive to institutional investors. In addition, 
institutions, because of fiduciary duty concerns, are more 
vigilant about making “prudent” investments that are less 
likely to lead to large losses. Institutional investors also 
prefer well-governed firms because there is evidence that 
suggests the stocks of such firms have higher liquidity and 
lower associated trading costs.21 
This Article describes a study that provides detailed data 
on institutional investor governance preferences. To the 
extent any conclusions can be reached in this area, the 
weight of the empirical evidence on corporate governance 
suggests that returns are enhanced by investing in firms 
with (at least) high-quality external governance. Therefore, a 
reasonable hypothesis, given the previously available 
evidence, would be that institutional ownership is associated 
with high-quality external governance. Though I find that 
high-quality external governance in the form of annual 
director elections (i.e., non-staggered boards) is associated 
with higher proportions of overall institutional ownership in 
one model specification (a relationship likely driven largely 
by mutual fund preferences), in another model specification, 
higher external governance quality as quantified by the G-
Index, a measure of exposure to the market for corporate 
control, is associated with lower proportions of overall 
 
when making investment decisions. On average, however, the investors 
surveyed indicated that, though they consider corporate governance 
information, they do not rely on it heavily in their decision making 
processes. Jeffrey Cohen, et al., Retail Investors’ Perceptions of the 
Decision-Usefulness of Economic Performance, Governance, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility Disclosures, 23 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 109, 116, 117 tbl.3 
(2011). 
20 Chung & Zhang, supra note 16, at 250. To be sure, a number of 
institutional investors also appear largely indifferent to corporate 
governance, but the claim being raised here relates to their interest, as a 
group, relative to individual investors’ interest, as a group. 
21 Id. at 250–51. 
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institutional ownership. This study’s results also reveal that 
there is a relationship between ownership by certain 
institutional investors, including, most notably, public 
pension funds, and low-quality external corporate 
governance in most model specifications. My analysis also 
reveals that high-quality internal governance, as measured 
by internally-focused governance metrics such as the ISS 
Corporate Governance Quotient (“ISS CGQ”), is associated 
with higher proportions of overall institutional ownership. 
Overall, the evidence reveals a relationship between 
institutional ownership, on the one hand, and high-quality 
internal governance and, in some cases, low-quality external 
governance, on the other hand. 
One note of clarification is in order. This study reveals 
institutional investor preferences relative to those of other 
market participants (i.e., individual investors)22 and suggests 
that institutions value purportedly high-quality internal 
governance more highly than individual investors and 
purportedly high-quality external governance less highly 
than individual investors. Thus, when I describe 
institutional investor “preferences” in this paper, I am 
referring to their “relative preferences.” 
In capital markets equilibrium, all stocks are held by 
someone, and all firms have owners. The stock price tells us 
how the market as a whole values a particular set of firm 
characteristics. This study does not compare the stock prices 
of firms with particular governance characteristics to 
determine overall market preferences. Rather, it looks at 
which investors hold the stock of certain types of firms and 
compares the number of shares held by institutions with 
those held by individuals. The study’s results suggest that (1) 
institutions self-select into firms with (and/or encourage 
firms to adopt mechanisms that reflect) purportedly high-
 
22 In this study, “institutional investor” is defined as institutions with 
$100 million or more under discretionary management. See infra note 181. 
For ease of exposition, I refer to market participants other than these 
institutions, which include individual investors, as well as institutions 
with less than $100 million under discretionary management, as 
“individual investors.” 
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quality internal governance, and (2), in some cases, self-
select into firms with (and/or encourage firms to adopt 
mechanisms that reflect) purportedly low-quality external 
governance. 
Assume for the sake of argument that all investors agree 
that better corporate governance leads to better firm 
performance. If this were the case, we would expect better 
governance to be priced into the stock (i.e., better governed 
firms, all else being equal, would have higher market 
valuations). Note, however, that not everyone will increase 
their investment in firms that improve the quality of 
corporate governance or buy the stock of firms with high-
quality governance characteristics. Instead, those that value 
the characteristics most highly (and are willing to pay for the 
attributes) will outbid those investors that value the 
characteristics less highly. The results of the instant study, 
which reveal higher institutional investment in firms with 
high-quality internal governance and, in many cases, lower 
institutional investment in firms with high-quality external 
governance, suggest that, on the whole, institutional 
investors believe that internal governance quality is more 
likely than external governance quality, holding all else 
equal, to lead to better firm performance. 
This all suggests that institutional investors, like 
Congress, prefer “quack corporate governance”––what I am 
using as a generic term23 for governance mechanisms upon 
 
23 Though my results show a preference for greater director 
independence, which underlies the reasoning for audit and compensation 
committee independence requirements, my data do not reveal a direct 
association between institutional ownership and the particular elements of 
SOX to which Professor Romano refers as examples of “quack corporate 
governance” (i.e., independent audit committees, restrictions on the 
provision of non-audit services, executive certification of financial 
statements, and the prohibition on executive loans). My data also do not 
reveal a direct association between institutional ownership and the 
particular elements of Dodd-Frank upon which Professor Bainbridge 
focuses (i.e., mandated shareholder advisory votes on executive 
compensation, independent compensation committees, new compensation 
disclosure requirements, affirmation of the SEC’s authority to promulgate 
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whose efficacy the empirical evidence casts substantial 
doubt. One could draw a number of conclusions about the 
reasons for these governance preferences of institutional 
investors. It could be the case that institutional investors are 
just as misinformed as Congress or that some institutional 
investors have political agendas unrelated to wealth 
maximization and invest to advance policy goals rather than 
profitability. It is also possible that institutional money 
managers are blindly following the governance 
recommendations of proxy advisory firms such as ISS 
without independent evaluation of the efficacy of the 
mechanisms promoted in the ratings index either due to 
laziness or due to a desire to insulate themselves from 
criticism should there turn out to be a significant governance 
breakdown at one of their portfolio firms. For reasons I 
discuss in Section IV, I find all of these potential 
explanations wanting and conclude instead that the most 
likely explanation is that these preferences exist because 
institutional investors believe high-quality internal 
governance devices to be value enhancing. 
I argue that my findings have significant implications for 
the quack corporate governance debate. Stockholders, as the 
residual claimants of a corporation, bear the costs of both 
poor governance and the implementation of ineffective 
governance mechanisms. Institutions, which are run by 
professional managers, know their preferences better than 
legislators or academics. If these sophisticated investors 
prefer high-quality internal governance over high-quality 
external governance, despite the seemingly limited empirical 
support for internal governance devices, this preference 
should be afforded greater weight than is currently the case 
in the debate about the efficacy of these mechanisms. 
The seeming preference by some types of institutional 
investors for low-quality external governance demonstrated 
in this study is a bit more surprising, particularly in light of 
the public opposition by certain prominent public pension 
 
rules related to shareholder proxy access for director nominees and 
disclosure of dual CEO/Chairman positions).  
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funds to antitakeover devices such as staggered boards. One 
reason for this apparent inconsistency could be that the 
corporate governance groups of many institutional investors 
are responsible for voting and proxy decisions, while the 
portfolio managers are responsible for investing decisions.24 
The corporate governance groups’ raison d’etre is to impose 
“best practices” on portfolio companies. For years, well-
known and highly respected legal scholars have repeatedly 
made the case that antitakeover devices are value 
destroying.25 It is not surprising, then, that those tasked 
with improving corporate governance would find such 
mechanisms objectionable. Those investing, however, may 
have different priorities. 
These different priorities may arise because portfolio 
managers, perhaps more than members of corporate 
governance staffs,26 realize that external governance is 
costly. Though many internal governance improvements 
(e.g., replacing inside directors with outside directors) are 
relatively inexpensive, for companies with the highest levels 
of vulnerability to hostile activity, removing protective 
devices (e.g., de-staggering the board) has significant 
ramifications. Portfolio managers realize the trade-offs 
inherent in holding management accountable and protecting 
their portfolio companies against opportunistic attack. These 
managers may err on the side of preferring or at least 
tolerating protective devices, secure in the knowledge that, 
as large investors, they have some ability to pressure 
management into accepting a truly value-enhancing 
takeover bid, should one materialize, despite the presence of 
defensive mechanisms. In addition, there is limited evidence 
that takeover defenses, including staggered boards, are 
 
24 Brandon S. Gold, Agents Unchained: The Determinant of Takeover 
Defenses in IPO Firms 56 (May 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262095, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8THY-9X57. 
25 See infra Part II.C. 
26 But see infra note 304 for evidence of a willingness to be flexible on 
some governance matters for IPO firms. 
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associated with higher firm values.27 Therefore, portfolio 
managers who invest in firms with antitakeover mechanisms 
in place may be acting rationally. Given these facts, I submit 
that, before criticizing legislators or courts for impeding the 
market for corporate control by making it easier for boards to 
resist hostile activity, one might want to consider the role 
institutional investors play in the perpetuation of 
antitakeover devices. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses 
the state of the empirical literature with respect to corporate 
governance and describes some recent efforts to improve 
corporate governance in the United States, specifically 
through Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. Part III describes 
the data and analytical methodologies of this study and 
presents results. Part IV considers the policy implications of 
these findings and also considers alternative explanations for 
the revealed governance preferences of institutional 
investors. Part V concludes. 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In the modern public corporation, the separation between 
ownership (i.e., by thousands of dispersed shareholders) and 
control (i.e., by professional managers)28 creates agency 
costs.29 Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to 
 
27 See infra Part II.C. 
28 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 120–21 (1932). 
29 There are three principal components of agency costs: (1) 
monitoring costs, the costs undertaken by the principal to limit divergence 
from her interests (e.g., developing appropriate incentives, costs of 
monitoring to limit the aberrant activities of the agent); (2) bonding costs, 
the costs of the agent to guarantee that she will not take certain actions to 
harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if 
she does take those actions (e.g., insurance policy, financial penalty 
clause); and (3) residual loss, or the dollar value of the reduction in the 
principal’s welfare due to the agent’s divergence from activities that would 
maximize the principal’s welfare. Residual loss is the loss that is left over 
after the incurrence of any monitoring and bonding costs. Michael C. 
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increase managerial accountability,30 thereby decreasing 
agency costs. With every new scandal––ranging from the 
massive accounting frauds of Enron and WorldCom in the 
early 2000s to the collapse or near collapse of large financial 
institutions during the 2008 financial crisis––confidence in 
the ability of corporate governance mechanisms to reign in 
managerial excess wanes, leading to capital markets 
turmoil.31 
This repeating cycle of crisis and turmoil leads to a 
continuous call for governance reform. Therefore, 
understanding what works in corporate governance is 
critical. There have been thousands of studies undertaken by 
law and finance professors that attempt to ascertain what 
mechanisms––both internal and external––increase 
shareholder value and minimize agency costs. Though no 
complete consensus on what does and does not work in 
corporate governance exists, the weight of the evidence 
seems to suggest that there is little to no relationship 
between internal governance quality and firm value. On the 
other hand, the empirical literature seems to suggest that 
there is a strong relationship between high-quality external 
governance (i.e., high exposure to the market for corporate 
control) and shareholder value. In this Part, I briefly 
describe the literature on corporate governance in the 
context of efforts to improve corporate performance through 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, corporate governance ratings, 
and the market for corporate control. 
A. Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and Director 
Independence 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in July 2002, was 
Congress’ response to the waning confidence in the capital 
 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
30 See generally Douglas M. Branson, Proposals for Corporate 
Governance Reform: Six Decades of Ineptitude and Counting, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 673, 676 (2013). 
31 Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 925–27 (2010). 
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markets in the early 2000s. SOX contained substantial 
regulations affecting the corporate governance practices of 
public corporations, including the following governance 
mandates: (1) a requirement that company audit committees 
be composed exclusively of independent directors, (2) a ban 
on the provision of non-audit services by corporate auditors, 
(3) a ban on the provision of loans by the corporation to 
executives, and (4) a requirement for executive certification 
of financial statements.32 Sarbanes-Oxley ushered in a new 
era of federal regulation and invited its share of criticism, 
both substantive and process-oriented. 
Since the passage of SOX, the most vocal opponent of the 
legislation in the legal academy has been Professor Roberta 
Romano. She argues that no case exists for the primary 
corporate governance provisions contained in Sarbanes-
Oxley.33 In a well-known article, Professor Romano 
methodically walks through each governance mandate in 
SOX and argues that each one was “seriously misconceived,” 
as the “extensive empirical literature” suggested that these 
mandates were unlikely to either improve the quality of 
financial audits or improve corporate performance and 
provide benefits to investors. 34 This is puzzling, she argues, 
as she wonders what type of legislative process could result 
in laws that in all likelihood would not generate their 
intended effect, namely an increase in shareholder welfare.35 
The story Professor Romano tells is one of legislating in a 
time of crisis. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted in July 
2002, less than one year after Enron’s implosion, amid a 
 
32 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2013) (non-
audit services ban); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402, 15 U.S.C. §78m 
(2013) (ban on loans to executives); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2013) (executive officer certification); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 775,775–77 (2002) (audit 
committee independence); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 777,777–78 (2002) (executive officer certification). 
33 Romano, supra note 1, at 1543. 
34 See id. at 1602. 
35 Id. at 1543. 
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sharply declining stock market.36 Beginning in December 
2001, Congress held a number of hearings on Enron’s failure, 
its causes and potential legislative solutions.37 In April 2002, 
the House of Representatives passed a bill following seven 
hearings in the House Financial Services Committee.38 
However, the Senate did not consider any legislation until 
shortly after WorldCom’s collapse in July 2002.39 
WorldCom’s demise followed revelations of accounting 
fraud, corporate misconduct, and bankruptcy filings at a 
number of leading public companies such as Tyco, Adelphia, 
and Global Crossing.40 Moreover, the stock market dropped 
precipitously during the time Congress was considering 
Sarbanes-Oxley,41 with a sharp market decline beginning in 
April 2002, and a bottoming out in July 2002.42 The market’s 
July 2002 low, which occurred on the second trading day 
after WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing and the day before the 
conference committee reported out a bill (July 23), 
represented a decline of more than one-third in value over 
the prior year.43 In short, Congress was operating in an 
environment of staggering investor losses and low investor 
confidence.44 Given the steep market decline from April to 
July 2002, members of Congress perceived that legislative 
inaction was not an option.45 
Professor Romano is highly critical of the Congressional 
legislative process and argues that this crisis situation led to 
the adoption of laws that the scholarly literature showed 
would not be effective. According to Professor Romano, the 
relevant evidence either went unnoticed or was ignored by 
 
36 Id. at 1544. 
37 Id. 




42 Id. at 1546. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1549. 
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Congress,46 and the witnesses called during the hearing 
process not only failed to enlighten Congress about the state 
of the empirical literature,47 but, in some cases, so-called 
“policy entrepreneurs” brought their own misguided agendas 
for governance reform.48 
It is noteworthy that, despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s stated 
purpose of restoring “investor confidence,” investors played 
only a minor role in the SOX hearings. Only five of the sixty-
five witnesses (7.7%) called by Congress during the House 
and Senate hearings were institutional investor 
representatives.49 One of these witnesses, John Biggs, CEO 
of TIAA-CREF, was called not as a representative of TIAA-
CREF, but rather, due to his role as a member of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees and the Public Oversight 
Board.50 In contrast, academics and policy analysts 
comprised eight of the total sixty-five witnesses (12.3%), 
while current or former government officials comprised 
eighteen of the sixty-five (27.7%).51 
Professor Romano points to an extensive body of 
literature that, she argues, demonstrates that the 
governance provisions in SOX would not generate their 
intended effects. She describes studies that not only find that 
independent boards fail to improve corporate performance, 
but also suggest that having too many outsiders on a board 
 
46 Id. at 1526. 
47 See, e.g., id. at 1575–76 (“Millstein in his testimony never referred 
to the existence of a literature at odds with his position on board 
independence, of which he was fully aware, given that he had coauthored 
an article at variance with the literature on the point. The literature was 
instead treated as though it did not exist.”). Note that Millstein’s specific 
independence recommendations referred to the full board (a substantial 
majority), nominating committees, and compensation committees. 
48 The idea for fully independent audit committees, for example, 
appears to have come from former SEC Chief Accountants Lynn Turner 
and Michael Sutton, both witnesses at the Senate hearing. See id. at 1574. 
49 Id. at 1569. 
50 See id. at 1571 n.139. 
51 See id. at 1569 tbl.3. 
DAVIS – FINAL  
No. 1:1] QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19 
can be harmful.52 She acknowledges that the literature on 
the relationship between audit committee independence 
specifically and firm performance is not as extensive as that 
on full board independence (there are four studies on which 
Professor Romano relies), but points out that none of those 
studies finds any relationship between audit committee 
independence and company performance.53 Professor 
Romano further notes that of sixteen studies on the 
relationship between audit committee independence and 
financial reporting misconduct, ten fail to find that full audit 
committee independence lessens accounting improprieties, 
and one yields inconsistent results.54 She acknowledges that 
five studies do show some relationship between full audit 
committee independence and fewer cases of financial 
reporting misconduct.55 Overall, however, Professor Romano 
believes this hardly constitutes a case for the SOX audit 
committee mandate. 
Professor Romano is not alone in her skepticism. 
Professor Larry Ribstein, for example, writes:  
Post-Enron reforms, including Sarbanes-Oxley, rely 
on increased monitoring by independent directors, 
auditors, and regulators who have both weak 
incentives and low-level access to information. This 
monitoring has not been, and cannot be, an effective 
way to deal with fraud by highly motivated insiders. 
Moreover, the laws are likely to have significant 
costs, including perverse incentives of managers, 
increasing distrust and bureaucracy in firms, and 
impeding information flows.56 
Also, in response to New York Times business columnist 
Joseph Nocera’s assertion that one of the benefits of SOX is 
that auditors will no longer report to management and 
 
52 See id. at 1530. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 1532. 
55 See id. at app.A at 1604–05. 
56 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 
(2002). 
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instead will report to the audit committee, which must be 
composed entirely of independent directors, Professor 
Stephen Bainbridge remarked that “[n]obody has yet shown 
that [this change] would have prevented debacles like Enron 
or will do so in the future. Indeed, Enron itself had an 
independent audit committee headed by Robert Jaedicke, a 
professor of accounting at Stanford University, who could 
hardly have been more qualified for the job.”57 
The charge of quack corporate governance also has been 
applied to the governance mandates contained in Dodd-
Frank, legislation born of the worst U.S. and global financial 
crisis since the Great Depression.58 The financial crisis 
yielded a loss of $17 trillion of household wealth and the 
shedding of 8.3 million jobs in the U.S. from 2008–2009.59 To 
stem the crisis, the U.S. government undertook 
extraordinary actions, including creating the $700 billion 
TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) relief package and 
investing an additional $787 billion in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, an economic stimulus 
program.60 The financial industry disruptions were not 
limited to the U.S., as many countries around the globe 
required massive multi-billion dollar bailouts.61 
Many believed that the crisis was largely caused by 
ineffective regulation of the financial sector.62 In the midst of 
the fall-out, Congress and the White House felt compelled to 
act. In January 2009, a New York Times editorial called on 
the leaders in Washington to make drastic changes to the 
regulatory landscape and said, “[a]nything less than a new 
 
57 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, 
Repenting in Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 89 (2006). 
58 Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012). 
59 Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory 
Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger 
Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 182 (2012). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 182–83. 
62 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 58, at 93–96 (discussing the origins of the 
financial crisis). 
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rules-based regime would be inadequate to the task of 
restoring confidence and, eventually, reviving the 
economy.”63 In July 2010, amid this environment of political 
urgency and economic uncertainty, Congress enacted Dodd-
Frank.64 
The most sweeping piece of financial reform legislation 
since the New Deal, Dodd-Frank, among other things, 
comprehensively regulates derivatives markets, provides for 
new means of data collection and financial sector 
transparency, and creates a mechanism for the liquidation of 
failing financial firms that does not put the economy or 
taxpayers at risk.65 Dodd-Frank also created the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and provided for new consumer 
and investor protections.66 
Additionally, Congress responded to a widespread belief 
that executive compensation practices were part of the 
problem. Specifically, there was a worry that incentive-based 
compensation led to short-term thinking and excessive risk-
taking.67 Dodd-Frank therefore contains a number of 
provisions intended to reduce this moral hazard and more 
effectively tie executive pay to long-term performance.68 
These provisions include mandating non-binding shareholder 
advisory votes on executive compensation (Section 951), 
 
63 Ludwig, supra note 59, at 183. 
64 Id. 
65 Barr, supra note 58, at 92. 
66 Id. 
67 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why 
Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1047 (2012) (“Because a rapid shift towards 
incentive-based compensation at financial institutions focused senior 
management on short-term results, longer-term risks were ignored or 
excessively discounted. For example, if the executives in charge of asset-
backed securitizations at a financial institution could make $100 million in 
bonuses in a single year if sufficient deals closed that year, such expected 
compensation could easily produce a ‘damn-the-torpedoes, full-speed-
ahead’ approach to risk taking. Indeed, why should executives so 
compensated worry at all about the longer-term risks to their bank? Thus, 
excessive compensation led to moral hazard.”). 
68 Id. at 1065. 
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disclosure of the ratio of CEO pay to that of the median 
company employee (Section 953), mandating the recovery of 
compensation awarded in error (Section 954), and disclosure 
of director and employee hedging (Section 955). The 
provision of Dodd-Frank most relevant for present purposes 
is Section 952: “Compensation Committee Independence.” 
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to 
promulgate a rule requiring the stock exchanges to mandate 
that listed companies (with few exceptions) have 
compensation committees made up entirely of independent 
directors.69 Section 952 further requires the SEC to consider, 
when developing its definition of “independence,” factors that 
include whether the director receives any compensation from 
the company (e.g., consulting fees) and whether the director 
is affiliated with the company or any of its subsidiaries or 
affiliates.70 In June 2012, the SEC adopted Rule 10C-1 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to implement this 
provision,71 and on January 11, 2013, the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ finalized their listing standards, 
which had an effective date of July 1, 2013, to comply with 
Rule 10C-1.72 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, in his piece “Dodd Frank: 
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,” criticizes 
Dodd-Frank’s requirement of complete compensation 
committee independence.73 The rationale for independent 
 
69 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
952(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1900, 1900 (2010). 
70 Id. at 1901. 
71 Melissa Maleske, NYSE and Nasdaq Propose Compensation 
Committee Independence Standards, INSIDE COUNSEL (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/11/28/nyse-and-nasdaq-propose-
compensation-committee-ind, archived at http://perma.cc/TFT7-M5DC. 
72 J. Mark Poerio et al., NYSE and Nasdaq Issue FINAL Listing Rule 
Changes for Compensation Committees and Compensation Advisers, PAUL 
HASTINGS (Feb. 2013), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/ 
2344.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/25SY-EQXD. 
73 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1805. As it turns out, the new 
standards did not represent a drastic change from prior practice. Since 
2003, the NYSE had mandated 100% independent compensation 
committees, and Nasdaq required either 100% independent compensation 
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compensation committees lies in the assumption that 
independent directors are more likely to bargain over 
executive pay and, in turn, prevent excessive or ill-
considered compensation.74 However, the available empirical 
evidence, argues Professor Bainbridge, suggests that this is 
not the case. Rather, studies show that director 
independence does not lead to better compensation decisions. 
Professor Bainbridge further notes that the independent 
compensation committee provision was supported by the 
Council of Institutional Investors, a pension fund trade 
association, and describes it as a “one-size-fits-all model 
being forced on all public companies.”75 In addition, Professor 
Bainbridge asserts that, like other Dodd-Frank governance 
mandates, the compensation committee independence 
requirement lacks empirical support, as most studies reject 
the hypothesis that independence is associated with better 
firm performance or CEO compensation practices.76 Indeed, 
 
committees or, in the absence of a standing compensation committee, all 
executive compensation decisions to be made by majority vote of a firm’s 
independent directors. See Maleske, supra note 71. Furthermore, the 2003 
listing standards did not represent a dramatic leap from then-current 
practice. Just prior to the institution of the stock exchange mandate for 
full compensation committee independence, on average, 92% of 
compensation committee members in a sample of 1,269 public companies 
were independent, and 77% of the public companies in this sample had 
fully independent compensation committees. See JOLENE DUGAN ET AL., 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, BOARD PRACTICES/BOARD PAY 1, 20 
(2006). These independence percentages are based on the definition of 
independence set forth by ISS GRS and exclude directors who provide (or 
have immediate family members or related entities that provide) 
professional services to the company or an executive and also exclude 
significant stockholders. Id. at 2. (This definition is more stringent than 
that of the stock exchanges for independence. Thus, under the stock 
exchange definition, a higher percentage of firms had independent 
compensation committee members.) The new listing standards 
promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank do include, however, as described 
above, a heightened standard of independence and a new Nasdaq 
requirement for a compensation committee. Poerio et al., supra note 72. 
74 Erica Beecher-Monas, The Risks of Reward: The Role of Executive 
Compensation in Financial Crisis, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 101, 120 (2011) 
75 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1805. 
76 Id. 
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there is some evidence that higher levels of independence are 
(counter-intuitively) associated with higher levels of 
executive compensation.77 
Not all scholars are as critical of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank. Professor Jack Coffee, for example, though 
acknowledging the shortcomings of the legislation, takes 
exception with the characterizations of SOX and Dodd-Frank 
set forth by Professors Romano and Bainbridge. He argues 
that crises are rare opportunities to overcome legislative 
inertia and effect necessary regulation.78 In addition, 
Professors Robert Prentice and David Spence offer a defense 
of SOX. They concede that Congress did not spend much (if 
any) time reviewing the empirical literature related to 
corporate governance before passing SOX.79 However, they 
argue that it goes too far to allege that enacting legislation 
inconsistent with the majority view of a large number of 
disparate studies reaching wide-ranging conclusions is 
“automatically [a] major gaffe. . . .”80 The scholars point to a 
number of studies (some of which, they admit, were 
conducted post-SOX enactment) that support the SOX 
governance provisions criticized by Professor Romano and 
others.81 Much of the evidence relates to the perennial 
question of the efficacy of board independence. 
The academic literature on the question of whether 
having more independent boards increases firm value or 
profitability is decidedly mixed, but there is evidence that 
certain beneficial practices accompany higher levels of board 
independence, including more willingness to replace 
underperforming CEOs and creating more value in 
connection with corporate takeovers.82 Also, according to 
 
77 Beecher-Monas, supra note 74, at 121. 
78 Coffee, supra note 67, at 1036. 
79 Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack 
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1843, 1845 (2007). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1865. See also id. at 1865 n.114 for a list of studies that detail 
ways in which board independence is associated with creating value for 
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Professors Andrew Fields and Phyllis Keys, there is 
“overwhelming support among financial researchers for 
outside directors providing beneficial monitoring and 
advisory functions to firm shareholders.” 83 
Professors Prentice and Spence further argue that 
Congress passed SOX, not in hopes of improving firm 
performance, but in hopes of improving the accuracy of 
financial statements, stem the tide of corporate fraud,84 and 
restore investor confidence.85 The empirical evidence, 
Professors Prentice and Spence argue, does support the view 
that higher levels of board independence translate into more 
accurate financial reporting.86 For example, studies show 
that firms with more independent boards engage in less 
earnings management87 and accounting fraud, have more 
informative financial statements and higher quality audits, 
and are subject to fewer SEC enforcement actions and 
shareholder lawsuits.88 Though the results of studies on the 
relationship between earnings restatements and board 
independence are mixed, the strong weight of the evidence is 
that higher levels of board independence are associated with 
more accurate financial reporting.89 Researchers studying 
the relationship between audit committee independence 
specifically and financial reporting quality find similar 
results.90 
 
shareholders in takeover situations, including studies finding an 
association between board independence and larger abnormal returns in 
management buyouts and an association between bidder firm board 
independence and abnormal returns surrounding takeover announcement. 
83 Id. at 1866–67. 
84 Id. at 1868. 
85 Id. at 1869. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1870–71. 
89 Id. at 1871. 
90 Id. at 1872–73. Note that there is some overlap between the studies 
that Professors Prentice and Spence cite and those noted by Professor 
Romano that indicate a relationship between audit committee 
independence and financial reporting. See supra text accompanying note 
55. 
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Though the data are mixed, much of the available 
empirical evidence does cast substantial doubt on the idea 
that internal governance mechanisms such as independent 
boards improve firm performance. Some scholars have 
suggested reasons for why board independence may lack 
empirical support. For example, Professor Jeff Gordon notes 
that the benefits of director independence are systemic and 
do not necessarily accrue to firms on an individual basis.91 
Independent boards, he argues, lead to a culture of better 
corporate governance, more reliable financial reporting, and 
less accounting fraud, which benefits the market and society 
as a whole.92 Such systemic benefits would not show up in 
cross-sectional studies of firms.93 Therefore, an absence of 
evidence with respect to the benefits of board independence 
does not mean that there are no benefits. Professor Gordon 
also offers another potential explanation: U.S. corporate 
governance is so good that marginal improvements in any 
particular governance mechanism are likely to have small, if 
not negligible, effects on firm performance.94 
Professor Jill Fisch offers the following perspective: 
boards have evolved from “advisory boards” that primarily 
counseled management on corporate strategy to “monitoring 
boards” that evaluate managerial performance and attempt 
to deter managerial impropriety.95 Professor Fisch argues 
that since monitoring boards “do not offer corporations 
strategic advice, operational analysis or other types of 
managerial support . . . large-scale empirical studies are 
unlikely to find a link between board monitoring and firm 
performance.”96 The primary benefit of monitoring boards is 
the ability to prevent managerial wrongdoing such as fraud. 
Yet, assessing the deterrent value of a monitoring board is 
 
91 Id. at 1869. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007). 
95 See id. at 1506. 
96 Fisch, supra note 31, at 929. 
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difficult, Professor Fisch argues, because one must engage in 
an “impossible counterfactual analysis”: would management 
have engaged in wrongdoing if not for the board’s actions?97 
Professor Fisch further suggests that, if accurate stock 
prices enhance market discipline, then perhaps board 
effectiveness should be measured not by absolute price (i.e., 
how the board maximizes firm value), but instead by “price 
quality” (i.e., the accuracy of financial disclosures that lead 
to informed prices).98 This sentiment is consistent with a 
theory espoused by Professor Gordon, who notes that 
independent directors can serve a number of purposes, 
including operating as “friction” in control markets and 
providing the oversight necessary to yield the public good of 
more accurate disclosures, thereby leading to more informed 
stock prices and better allocation of capital.99 
B. Corporate Governance Ratings 
The story told by the SOX and Dodd-Frank critics is one 
in which an inept and/or lazy Congress passed governance 
mandates without stopping to consider the ample empirical 
evidence that casts substantial doubt on the effectiveness of 
the enacted provisions. This story is similar to the one told 
by critics of commercial governance ratings firms, who claim 
that firms such as ISS peddle voodoo ratings lacking 
empirical foundation to naïve institutional investors for 
profit. 
Commercial service providers such as ISS and The 
Corporate Library have developed metrics to assess the 
strength of corporate governance in public companies. ISS, 
the leading governance rating agency, will not disclose how 
the various elements of its rating score, the CGQ, are 
weighted, but has revealed that the most important 
variables in generating a firm’s CGQ relate to audit 
committee independence, financial expertise of audit 
committee members, cost of executive and employee equity 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 932. 
99 Gordon, supra note 94, at 1469, 1564. 
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issuances, board independence generally, director stock 
ownership requirements, and incorporation in a state with 
anti-takeover provisions.100 Thus, the rating appears to be 
heavily weighted toward the quality of internal governance.  
Professor Paul Rose is a leading critic of corporate 
governance ratings and laments the use of “rules of thumb” 
translated into hard metrics by governance ratings firms to 
judge firms.101 He states, “good governance may affect firm 
performance, but it is not clear that the variables selected by 
governance ratings agencies are the appropriate metrics to 
test and promote good firm performance.”102 Similarly, 
Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld argues that the factors 
considered in generating corporate governance ratings are 
largely the product of “Wall Street superstitions” and “clichés 
and myths, rather than . . . genuine research.”103 Professor 
Sonnenfeld concedes that some of the variables in corporate 
governance ratings are appropriate.104 However, Professor 
Sonnenfeld says, “ISS . . . blend[s] these dimensions with 
superstitious ones to create checklists of highly stringent 
standards, regardless of the genuine research foundation to 
support them.”105 
Professors Lawrence Brown and Marcus Caylor, in a 
study commissioned by ISS, find that higher corporate 
governance scores based on ten of fifty-one governance 
attributes derived from ISS data are associated with 
relatively higher firm profitability, as measured by return on 
equity and return on assets.106 However, Professors Sanjai 
 
100 Rose, supra note 4, at 900–01. This information is based on the ISS 
CGQ formula as it stood following the 2006 ratings guideline changes. 
101 Id. at 910. 
102 Id. at 913. 
103 Id. at 910. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 913. Finding that only ten of the fifty-one attributes are 
significantly and positively associated with company performance supports 
the idea that corporate governance ratings can contain a lot of noise (i.e., 
only a subset of the attributes in the typical ratings indicators have any 
relationship with firm performance). Id. at 913–14. 
DAVIS – FINAL  
No. 1:1] QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 
Bhagat and Brian Bolton, using the full set of ISS corporate 
governance metrics (not the subset used by Professors Brown 
and Caylor), as well as the governance scores of ISS 
competitor The Corporate Library, find that these 
governance ratings are not significantly correlated with 
either contemporaneous or future firm operating 
performance, as measured by return on assets.107 This 
evidence calls into question the relationship between 
corporate governance ratings and firm value. 
Other empirical evidence also casts serious doubt on the 
efficacy of corporate governance indices. For example, 
Professors Rob Daines, Ian Gow, and David Larcker, after 
examining corporate ratings produced by ISS, 
GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate 
Library, find little evidence that commercial corporate 
governance ratings are particularly useful in predicting 
future operating performance, future accounting 
restatements, or future shareholder litigation.108 Similarly, 
Professors Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano, after reviewing 
governance indices generated by academics and commercial 
ratings firms, conclude that there is little evidence of any 
relationship between commercial ratings and firm 
performance.109 As Professor Larcker, who along with 
 
107 Id. at 914. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance 
and Firm Performance 5–6 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Columbia Business Law Review), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.180.5811&rep=re
p1&type=pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H5E6-RXA7. Professors Bhagat 
and Bolton use fifty-two ISS governance characteristics to construct the 
governance score used in their analysis. Because Professors Bhagat and 
Bolton do not list the fifty-two metrics in their paper, it is not possible to 
know which additional governance characteristic they use in constructing 
the ISS governance score that is not used by Professors Brown and Caylor. 
Id. at 38 tbl.1. Recall that Professors Brown and Caylor construct a data 
set using fifty-one ISS governance attributes. See supra note 106.  
108 Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the 
Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 
439, 440 (2010). 
109 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and 
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1850–52 
(2008). 
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Professors Scott Richardson and Irem Tuna, finds no 
relationship between a variety of corporate governance 
indicators and firm performance, states, “[l]ots of people are 
coming up with governance scorecards . . . . They’re coming 
up with best practices and selling this stuff. As far as we can 
tell, there’s no evidence that those scorecards map into better 
corporate performance or better behavior by managers.”110 
Professor Rose argues that besides offering an inaccurate 
assessment of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance, 
rigid governance metrics have a more troubling systemic 
impact: they serve to standardize governance mechanisms 
and compel adherence to a fixed set of practices in a context 
where flexibility would be more desirable.111 The 
proliferation of one-size-fits-all governance scores can stifle 
potentially beneficial managerial innovation.112 Though ISS’ 
governance recommendations are not mandatory as a matter 
of law, given ISS’ influence in the institutional investor 
community, firms feel compelled to comply, thus leading, 
Professor Rose argues, to “a more homogenous corporate 
population.”113 
C. The Market for Corporate Control 
Though many members of the academy tend to be 
skeptical of internal governance mechanisms, external 
governance mechanisms find broad support among legal 
scholars. Hostile takeovers, under the conventional wisdom, 
serve to discipline management and lead to higher 
shareholder value. Poor firm performance leads to a lower 
stock price, which makes it attractive for better management 
to take over a company and, in turn, improve operations and 
increase firm value. Given the benefits derived from hostile 
takeovers, Professor Jonathan Macey argues that regulators 
have it exactly backwards—the governance devices that are 
most ineffective are championed, while the mechanisms most 
 
110 Rose, supra note 4, at 913. 
111 Id. at 917. 
112 Id. at 918–19. 
113 Id. 
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likely to improve firm performance attract regulatory 
attention.114 In particular, he points to “ineffective” boards of 
directors and argues that they enjoy “regulatory 
subsidies,”115 while the “effective” market for corporate 
control has been hamstrung by “protectionist legislation” and 
court decisions that allow target firm managers to thwart the 
efforts of hostile bidders and “escape the discipline of a 
hostile takeover.”116 Professor Macey’s views are consistent 
with the dominant law and economics view articulated by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel in the 
1980s, who advocated managerial passivity in the face of 
hostile bids because of what they viewed as the clear benefits 
stemming from takeovers.117 Even Professor Rose, who 
expresses grave concerns about the potential for 
homogenization in corporate governance as a result of 
corporate governance ratings, concludes that a potentially 
beneficial side effect of the governance ratings industry is its 
effect on the market for corporate control, given the 
governance industry’s stance against antitakeover devices.118 
Here, the empirical evidence is seemingly clear: target 
shareholders historically have enjoyed substantial gains 
from takeovers.119 This is unsurprising; hostile (and friendly) 
bidders have to offer a premium over the current share price 
to induce shareholders to sell their shares. The use of 
effective antitakeover devices can have two potential effects. 
On the one hand, it can reduce the possibility of a successful 
takeover, either because the presence of such devices deters 
hostile bids or because the use of such devices provides a 
 
114 MACEY, supra note 14, at 48. 
115 Id. at 49. 
116 Id. at 46. Professor Macey points to the Williams Act, passed by 
Congress in 1968, and the judicial sanctioning of the use of poison pills by 
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 as examples of legal impediments to 
the market for corporate control. Id. at 122, 123. 
117 Fisch, supra note 31, at 940. 
118 Rose, supra note 4, at 918. 
119 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and 
Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1349 (2013). 
DAVIS – FINAL  
32 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
means for management to defeat hostile bids.120 As a result, 
because the threat of a hostile takeover purportedly serves to 
discipline management, having defenses available 
diminishes the disciplining effect substantially and removes 
the pressure on management to maximize shareholder value, 
even in the absence of a pending bid.121 On the other hand, 
antitakeover devices have the potential to maximize 
shareholder value, as managers can use takeover defenses 
either to give them negotiating leverage with a hostile 
bidder, leading to higher sale prices, or to ward off bids that 
undervalue the target.122 Thus, takeover defenses can be 
either value enhancing or value reducing.123 
Other than dual-class stock, a structure that is rarely 
employed,124 the combination of a poison pill and an 
“effective staggered board”125 is the most potent takeover 
defense available.126 Poison pills are considered lethal, hence 
the name. The significant voting and economic dilution a 
hostile bidder suffers by triggering a poison pill (by crossing 
a pre-determined threshold of ownership, such as 15%, 
without the approval of the target board) serves as a highly 
 




124 Id. at 1353. 
125 An “effective” staggered board is a staggered board whose potency 
cannot be diminished by: (1) stockholder ability to dismantle the staggered 
board unilaterally and easily by amending the company’s bylaws with a 
majority vote, (2) stockholder ability to pack the board with new directors, 
thereby creating a new majority, or (3) stockholder ability to remove 
directors without cause. Id. at 1353 n.110. In Delaware, the default rule is 
that directors on a staggered board may only be removed for cause. See 
DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2014). However, a company’s charter 
may provide for removal without cause. A company with such a charter 
provision does not have an effective staggered board. See, e.g., the 
staggered board of Airgas, Inc. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, 
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 116 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Airgas’s charter allows for 33% of 
the outstanding shares to call a special meeting of the stockholders, and to 
remove the entire [classified] board without cause by a vote of 67% of the 
outstanding shares.”). 
126 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1365–66. 
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effective deterrent for unfriendly takeovers. Corporate 
boards can unilaterally (i.e., without shareholder approval) 
adopt a poison pill at any time, and many firms wait until a 
hostile bid appears before putting a pill in place. A study of 
hostile takeover attempts performed by Professors Bebchuk, 
John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian revealed that every 
target either had a pre-existing pill in place or adopted a pill 
once a hostile bid was made.127 Thus, every company has a 
“shadow pill.” 
It is fair to say, therefore, that the most important 
takeover defense is the presence of an effective staggered 
board.128 Courts have the power to force a company to 
redeem a pill but are unlikely to do so. Indeed, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has never ordered a company’s board to 
redeem its poison pill. Poison pills, however, can be 
redeemed by a board of directors voluntarily. Therefore, as a 
practical matter, in order to have the poison pill redeemed, a 
hostile suitor must either convince the board to support the 
takeover (thus, turning a hostile bid into a friendly deal) or 
take control of the board by electing directors, via a proxy 
contest, who will vote to redeem the poison pill once they 
take office. Proxy contests, however, are a less viable 
strategy for hostile bidders facing targets with staggered 
boards. 
In a classified or staggered board, not all directors are up 
for re-election annually. Rather, director terms are 
staggered, generally providing for only one-third of the 
directors to seek re-election in any given year. Therefore, 
even if the hostile bidder could convince the target’s 
shareholders to vote in favor of its director nominees, it 
would take two election cycles (or as long as two years) 
before the hostile bidder could seize control of the target’s 
board and have the pill removed. This delay imposes costs 
and uncertainty, so it is an unappealing prospect for a hostile 
bidder. Staggered boards present a nearly insurmountable 
 
127 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, 
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, & 
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 926–27 (2002). 
128 See Klausner, supra note 119, at 1366. 
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hurdle to hostile takeover success. No hostile bid has ever 
succeeded in the face of an effective staggered board and a 
pill.129 Thus, arguably, no other defensive mechanisms (e.g., 
stockholder inability to call a special meeting or to act via 
written consent) matter much at the margin for a firm with 
an effective staggered board.130 
The evidence on the effect of staggered boards is 
seemingly clear. Professors Bebchuk, Coates, and 
Subramanian find evidence consistent with the claim that 
staggered boards decrease shareholder value. Specifically, 
they find that companies with staggered boards are more 
likely to remain independent in the face of a takeover 
battle131 and that staying independent leads to lower value 
for shareholders, relative to those firms that are acquired.132 
The researchers also find no statistically significant 
difference between the premiums commanded by acquisition 
targets with staggered boards and those targets without 
staggered boards,133 which casts doubt on the claim that 
staggered boards increase target bargaining leverage in a 
way that can be value enhancing. The researchers, overall, 
find an average loss of share value of 8–10% for firms with 
staggered boards.134 
Similarly, Professors Bebchuk and Alma Cohen find that 
companies with staggered boards have lower firm value than 
 
129 In a study of bids during the five-year period of 1996–2000, 
Professors Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian find that no hostile bidder 
successfully gained control of a board of a company with an effective 
staggered board through winning director elections. Bebchuk et. al., supra 
note 127, at 890. They also find that, because threats of a hostile takeover 
against an effective staggered board lack credibility given how difficult it 
is to seize control of the board, effective staggered boards make it easier 
for targets to remain independent. Their study shows that the presence of 
an effective staggered board almost doubles the likelihood of remaining 
independent from 34% to 61%. Id. at 890–91. 
130 For firms without effective staggered boards, these mechanisms, of 
course, can have an important effect. Klausner, supra note 119, at 1366. 
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
132 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1354. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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firms with directors who stand for annual election.135 
Professors Cohen and Charles Wang find evidence consistent 
with the claim that the relationship between staggered 
boards and firm value is a causal one (i.e., staggered boards 
lead to reductions in firm value as opposed to the reverse 
causal story that firms with low values opt for the protection 
afforded by staggered boards).136 Also, consistent with 
evidence of staggered boards as “value destroyers,” 
Professors Re-Jin Guo, Timothy Kruse, and Tom Nohel find 
that announcements of board declassifications yield small 
but statistically significant positive abnormal returns.137 
There also is extensive empirical evidence that suggests 
that other external governance mechanisms are value 
enhancing. The G-Index and the E-Index are two leading 
measures of managerial entrenchment and vulnerability to 
takeover. The G-Index, created by Professors Paul Gompers, 
Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, consists of twenty-four 
metrics designed to measure the balance of power between 
the board and shareholders and the ease by which directors 
can be replaced via hostile takeover or proxy contest.138 
Professors Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick find that from 1990–
1999 firms with G-Index scores in the lowest decile (those 
with the highest exposure to the market for corporate 
control) enjoy higher value and better performance than 
firms with G-Index scores in the highest decile (those with 
the lowest exposure to the market for corporate control).139 
 
135 Id. 
136 Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards 
Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment , J. FIN. 
ECON. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–4), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141410, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6XVX-WJA7, cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1355. 
137 Re-Jin Guo et al., Activism and the Shift to Annual Director 
Elections, J. Acct. & Fin. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20), cited in 
Klausner, supra note 119, at 1361. 
138 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363–64. 
139 Id. at 1364. More recently, this ability to earn abnormal returns is 
disappearing as investors learn how to differentiate between firms that 
score well or poorly on governance metrics. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., 
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Hundreds of articles using the G-Index as a proxy for 
governance quality have appeared in the academic 
literature,140 and an analysis of firm differences in 
accordance with the G-Index reveals that firms with weaker 
shareholder rights have lower profits, sales growth, and 
value.141 
The E-Index, created by Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Allen Ferrell, consists of six characteristics related to 
managerial entrenchment.142 The researchers identified 
these six metrics from among the twenty-four metrics in the 
G-Index that are associated with firm value as measured by 
Tobin’s Q.143 Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell find 
that greater board entrenchment, as measured by the E-
Index, is associated not only with lower firm values, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q,144 but also with lower returns.145 
Another study by Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 
finds a relationship between high E-Index (managerial 
entrenchment) and lower firm value, profitability, and sales 
 
Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and 
Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324 (2013). 
140 A Scopus search reveals that as of November 26, 2014, 1,471 
articles have cited the Gompers et al. study. Scopus Search on Gompers 
Study, SCOPUS, www.scopus.com/home.url (search “‘Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices’”; then select “Corporate governance and equity prices” 
hyperlink by Gompers, Ishii, Metrick). Though this does not mean that all 
such articles use the G-Index as a variable in analyses, it is reasonable to 
assume that a large number do. 
141 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-
Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1685 (2013). 
142 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in 
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009). 
143 Id. at 784–785. Elements include staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for 
mergers and for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes. 
    144 Tobin’s Q is defined by the researchers as “the market value 
of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of 
common stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance 
sheet deferred taxes.” Id. at 800. 
145 Id. at 786. 
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growth.146 The E-Index is a popular metric and has been 
used in 158 studies since its introduction in 2004.147 
Though the G-Index is a widely used metric in academic 
research, Professor Michael Klausner argues that the 
emphasis on the G-Index is misplaced. As Professor Klausner 
points out, only some of the elements of the index can be 
used for managerial entrenchment, while others can be used 
only in limited circumstances for that purpose.148 Professor 
Klausner argues that many elements in the G-Index “have 
(1) no impact on management entrenchment, (2) no impact 
on entrenchment if a firm has an effective staggered board, 
(3) an impact on entrenchment only under limited 
circumstances, or (4) no relevance to entrenchment and in 
fact affirmatively beneficial impacts on governance.”149 Thus, 
the index “contain[s] unnecessary noise” and introduces the 
potential for finding a “correlation with no potential 
causation.”150 
Professor Klausner further argues that the counting of 
takeover defenses reflects a pervasive misunderstanding in 
the finance literature. More devices does not equal more 
entrenchment; thus, counting the number of takeover devices 
a company employs provides no information about that firm’s 
exposure to the market for corporate control or any other 
aspect of the firm’s governance.151 Professor Klausner further 
criticizes the G-Index for giving equal weight to all of the 
elements in the index, when, if they have any effect on 
 
146 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 139, at 341–43, cited in Bebchuk, 
supra note 141, at 1686. 
147 Based on articles appearing on SSRN. Links to 158 Studies 
Available on SSRN that Use the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell, 2009), LUCIAN AYRE BEBCHUK, http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/E642-C6MG 
(last updated Nov. 2014), cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363 n.155. 
148 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363. 
149 Id. at 1364. Elements in the G-Index widely seen as beneficial 
include: “director indemnification provided for in bylaws, director 
indemnification provided by agreement, and protection of outside directors 
from monetary liability for violation of the duty of care.” Id. at 1367. 
150 Id. at 1363. 
151 Id. at 1365. 
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entrenchment, they do so at varying levels.152 Given the 
empirical support for the relationship between the G-Index 
and firm performance, Professor Klausner concedes that the 
G-Index must be “measuring something,” but finds it 
implausible that the “something” is the level of managerial 
entrenchment153 or quality of external governance. He also 
argues that the E-Index, another metric that, as noted above, 
is widely used in the academic literature, suffers from the 
same flaws as the G-Index. 
  Despite Professor Klausner’s skepticism of the 
measures of external governance typically used in academic 
studies, the weight of empirical evidence supports the value 
of high-quality external governance. However, some scholars 
point to the limitations of the market for corporate control 
and note that not all takeovers are efficient. The heyday of 
the hostile takeover was in the 1980s, as the idea of creating 
shareholder value became highly influential in the business 
community.154 As Professor Gordon describes, however, the 
1980s also saw its share of high-profile hostile takeover 
failures, which damaged the credibility of the practice.155 
After the 1980s came the realization that hostile takeovers 
were a high-cost way to minimize managerial agency costs.156 
In addition, there are limits to the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control as a disciplining device. Some 
companies are simply too big to buy.157 Other companies are 
too small to be worth the effort required of a hostile bid 
because takeovers are costly. The need for financing requires 
favorable credit market conditions.158 Also, the high 
transaction costs associated with hostile bids means that 
they are only pursued in situations where there is significant 
perceived managerial underperformance.159 This 
 
152 Id. at 1364. 
153 Id. 
154 Gordon, supra note 94, at 1527. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Fisch, supra note 31, at 940–42. 
158 Id. at 942. 
159 Gordon, supra note 94, at 1528. 
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“lumpiness,” in turn, reduces deterrence.160 Also, hostile 
takeovers are likely to occur only if a company appears to be 
undervalued. If a firm’s stock price is too high, whether 
because of an overheated stock market or accounting fraud, 
the market for corporate control offers no solution.161 
The market for corporate control also has the potential to 
be overinclusive, leading to inefficient takeovers. Specifically, 
takeovers have the potential to take advantage of temporary 
dips in target share prices, and shareholder collective action 
problems can make it difficult for target shareholders to 
identify these situations.162 Professors Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny suggest that misvaluation of target firms, not 
potential synergy, drives most takeover activity.163 
Professors Ming Dong, David Hirshleifer, Scott Richardson, 
and Siew Hong Teoh suggest that bidders may expropriate 
value from target shareholders either by buying targets for 
cash at prices below intrinsic value or by using their 
overvalued stock as acquisition currency.164 
De-staggering boards, in particular, can be inefficient. 
Although moving to annual director elections may better 
discipline managers, further exposing them to the market for 
corporate control, annual elections could also be adverse to 
the interests of large institutional investors.165 For example, 
annual director elections are beneficial to activist hedge 
funds seeking to replace directors with those sympathetic to 
their efforts to, say, initiate a sale of the company to a third 
party.166 The short-term focus of some hedge funds, however, 
could be at odds with the interests of stockholders with a 
long-term perspective.167 
One empirical study provides evidence that antitakeover 
devices can improve shareholder value. Though takeover 
 
160 Id. 
161 Fisch, supra note 31, at 942. 
162 Id. at 940–41. 
163 Id. at 941. 
164 Id. 
165 Rose, supra note 4, at 909. 
166 Id. 
167 See id. 
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defenses are generally believed to be value reducing, 
Professors William Johnson, Jonathan Karpoff, and Sangho 
Yi find evidence that firms with substantial contractual 
commitments to customers, suppliers, and strategic partners 
commonly go public with takeover defenses, and that these 
defenses increase share value.168 For these firms, takeover 
defenses can be value enhancing because they provide some 
reassurance to the firm’s partners that the company will 
maintain these relationships, thereby encouraging those 
partners to invest in the relationships.169 
Another recent study also calls into question the claim 
that classified boards destroy shareholder value.170 Using 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, for the period 1978–2011, 
Professors Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov, and Simone 
Sepe find in the cross-section, consistent with the prior 
literature, that firms with staggered boards have lower 
values.171 However, they find the opposite result when 
viewing the data in the time series (panel data regression), 
as board de-staggering is associated with declining value and 
moving from annual director elections to a classified board 
 
168 William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover 
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms 29 (Sept. 22, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1923667, archived at http://perma.cc/4P2G-7XBM, cited in 
Klausner, supra note 119, at 1334–35. 
169 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1335. 
170 Liz Hoffman, Staggered Boards May Boost Returns: Study, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 
2013/12/11/staggered-boards-may-boost-returns-study/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2FWV-5J7D (citing K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. 
Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 3–4 
(July 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364165&download=ye
s, archived at http://perma.cc/38RB-AKRT). 
171 K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, 
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 4–5 (July 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2364165&download=yes, archived at http://perma.cc/38RB-
AKRT. 
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structure with increasing value.172 To help explain their 
novel results, they test the assertion that staggered boards 
actually may be advantageous for companies because they 
commit shareholders and boards to longer-term horizons. As 
support for this hypothesis, their study reveals that the 
association between higher firm value and adopting a 
staggered board is significantly stronger for firms that: (1) 
have higher R&D expenditures; (2) have more patents and 
hence are more successful at innovation; (3) have more 
intangible assets; and (4) are larger and presumably more 
complex.173 Therefore, as the researchers argue, staggered 
boards, which can allow for more managerial stability and 
continuity, may “offer an ‘institutional memory’” that 
prevents rapid changes in a firm’s business strategy in 
response to short-term demands from the market.174 The 
results of this study are consistent with those of Professors 
Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel Taylor—who find 
negative stock market reactions following proposals to 
eliminate staggered boards175—and consistent with the 
literature that suggests classified boards can provide value-
 
172 Id. Employing panel data regression analysis allows the 
researchers to control for firm-specific, time-invariant factors that may 
affect firm value. Using tools such as firm fixed effects removes any purely 
cross-sectional (i.e., across firm) correlation between board type (e.g., 
staggered or unitary board) and firm value, thus greatly reducing the risk 
the correlation a researcher finds between those variables is spurious. 
Panel data regression analysis with firm-level fixed effects allows a 
researcher to answer whether, for any firm in the sample, the firm’s value 
increases or decreases as the firm’s board type changes over time. In other 
words, in firm-level fixed effects models, the researchers are comparing 
changes in board type over time with changes in firm value over time 
within individual firms, instead of across firms. The underlying premise 
for this analysis is that if the unobserved firm characteristics do not 
change over time (i.e., are time-invariant), then any changes the 
researchers observe in firm value over the study period are the result of 
influences other than (fixed) omitted variables. 
173 Id. at 7. 
174 Id. at 8. 
175 See David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The 
Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 
431, 433 (2011). 
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enhancing continuity and stability.176 This suggests that the 
empirical case against staggered boards is not as clear as it 
was once thought. That said, despite these findings, most of 
the empirical evidence suggests the lack of exposure to the 
market for corporate control is value destroying. 
III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, DATA, 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
A. Research Objective 
My objective is to examine the relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate governance in hopes of 
yielding meaningful insight about institutional investor 
governance preferences. To this end, I employ ordinary least 
squares (“OLS”) cross-sectional regression analysis and 
pooled OLS regression analysis. Through these analyses, I 
will be able to determine how strongly various corporate 
governance mechanisms are associated with level of 
institutional ownership. 
B. Data and Sample 
My sample of firms includes all those listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)that had common stock 
trading information in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (“CRSP”) database177 for which data was available for 
the variables used in this study. My sample size ranges from 
618 to 909 firms, depending on specification. 
The Thomson Financial institutional holdings database is 
the source of institutional ownership data, both overall and 
for institutional ownership by type. The Thomson Financial 
 
176 Cremers et al., supra note 171, at 8 (citing STEPHEN A. ROSS, 
RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1991)); Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & Charles 
T. Haag, Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate over Classified 
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1055 (1999). 
177 See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail 
Flight, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 36, 59 (2014), for a discussion of sample 
construction.  
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S34 database provides five classifications of institutional 
investors: (1) banks; (2) insurance companies; (3) investment 
companies; (4) independent investment advisors; and (5) 
corporate (private) pension funds, public pension funds, 
university and foundation endowments; and miscellaneous. 
However, the S34 database’s type classifications for years 
after 1998, per Thomson Financial, are not reliable. 
Therefore, I use Professor Brian Bushee’s classifications, 
supplemented by my own research when necessary to fill in 
missing information, to classify the institutional investors in 
this study.178 Professor Bushee divides institutional investors 
into eight categories: (1) banks; (2) insurance companies; (3) 
investment companies; (4) independent investment advisors; 
(5) corporate (private) pension funds; (6) public pension 
funds; (7) university and foundation endowments; and (8) 
miscellaneous.179 In my analysis, I combine investment 
companies and independent investment advisors into one 
group––investment companies or “mutual funds”––and 
maintain all other Bushee classifications. 
Information on stock prices, outstanding shares, and 
trading volume is from the CRSP database, and the merged 
CRSP-Compustat database is the source of accounting data. I 
obtained research coverage and activity data from the First 
Call (Thomson Financial) database, and news coverage data 
from ProQuest Newsstand articles. Thomson Financial is the 
source of industry Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) 
codes. I obtained data on S&P 500 composition from 
Compustat’s Index Constituents database. 
I obtained Index and Industry CGQs and governance data 
from ISS; the E-Index for the years 2002–2006 from 
 
178 I am grateful to Professor Bushee for sharing his classification 
database. Institutional Investor Classification Data (1981-2009), WHARTON 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/ 
bushee/, archived at http://perma.cc/3E2F-ZTFU (last updated July 15, 
2010). 
179 Institutional Investor Classification Data: Variable Definitions, 
WHARTON UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
faculty/bushee/IIvars.html, archived at http://perma.cc/86XS-S86W (last 
updated June 10, 2014). 
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Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s website and for years 2007–2010 
through calculations derived from information in the 
RiskMetrics database; the G-Index for 2002–2007 from the 
RiskMetrics database; data on Delaware incorporation from 
the RiskMetrics database; and data on total restatement 
history and “irregularity” restatement history through June 
30, 2006, from Professor Andrew Leones’ website.180 
Information on restatements after June 30, 2006, was hand 
collected from securities filings (appearing primarily on 
Form 8-K) and news reports. 
C. Empirical Methodology and Results of Analysis 
1. 2010 OLS Regression 
My OLS regression analysis uses March 31, 2010, the last 
quarter end in which the ISS CGQ was in use, as the date of 
interest. The dependent variable in my analysis is 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN)181 (calculated as the 
number of shares of a firm’s stock held by institutions 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding), as of 
March 31, 2010. I have seven independent variables of 
interest. The first three variables relate to the quality of 
 
180 See Andy Leone’s Home Page, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI - SCHOOL OF 
BUSINESS, http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
K7LC-TPEQ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (containing link to GAO 
Restatement Data). 
181 Because of duplicative reporting by institutions on the required 
Form 13-Fs (all institutions with $100 million dollars or more in securities 
under discretionary management are required to report their holdings to 
the SEC each quarter), some firms in the study sample have institutional 
ownership percentage values that, as calculated, exceed 100%. Other 
researchers find that such instances of duplicative reporting are generally 
rare, and, thus, the figures, though anomalous, should not bias this study’s 
results significantly. See, e.g., ANJAN V. THAKOR, JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & 
DAVID A. GULLEY, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION app. I, at 2. (2005). Also, note that the institutional ownership 
variable only represents stock owned by large institutions (that is, those 
with $100 million or more in assets under management). Given data 
limitations, it is not possible to know precisely what proportion of “non- 
institutional ownership” is ownership by individual investors rather than 
small institutional investors. 
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internal governance, either primarily or exclusively. The last 
four variables relate to the quality of external governance. 
The first independent variable of interest is the March 31, 
2010, ISS Index CGQ (INDEXCGQ).182 Historically, ISS used 
public disclosures to gather firm-specific data on sixty-one 
different factors in eight different categories:183 (1) board of 
directors; (2) audit; (3) charter and bylaw provisions; (4) 
antitakeover provisions; (5) executive and director 
compensation; (6) progressive practices; (7) ownership; and 
(8) director education.184 ISS then developed a CGQ for each 
company based on scores achieved on these variables by 
comparing each firm with the other firms in its peer market 
(e.g., the S&P 500, Russell 3000). For example, an S&P 500 
company with an Index CGQ of 82 has achieved a higher 
governance score than 82% of the firms in the S&P 500. 
Thus, firms with the highest scores are considered to have 
the highest quality corporate governance. As discussed 
previously, though ISS does not reveal publicly the weights 
underlying each factor in the final index score, it is 
reasonable to conclude that internal governance factors are 
more heavily weighted than external governance factors. Six 
of the eight categories and forty-one of the sixty-one factors 
relate only to internal governance matters: (1) board of 
directors (excluding the absence of a staggered board, which 
is important in contests for corporate control); (2) audit; (5) 
 
182 CGQ data was first published on September 30, 2002 (outside of 
publication in a pilot program on December 31, 2001). As of December 31, 
2009, ISS no longer updated the CGQ scores as it transitioned to a new 
governance rating scale. However, that new scale was not put into place 
until June 2010. Thus, available information from ISS on corporate 
governance scores on March 31, 2010, was based on information updated 
on December 31, 2009. 
183  See infra Appendix A for a list of these factors. Appendix A 
contains the pre-2006 factors. CGQ scores before 2006 were based on sixty-
one factors. The 2006 CGQ scores were based on sixty-eight factors, and 
the 2007–2010 CGQ scores were based on sixty-six factors. infra Appendix 
A. 
184 Some variables are also evaluated in combination because ISS 
believes governance is enhanced by the presence of certain clusters of 
governance characteristics and practices. 
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executive and director compensation; (6) progressive 
practices; (7) ownership; and (8) director education (factors 
1–4, 6–21, and 41–61). Also, as discussed in Part II.B, five of 
the six most heavily weighted elements in the CGQ relate to 
internal governance. 
The second independent variable of interest is ISS’ 
Industry CGQ (INDUSCGQ). The Industry CGQ reflects a 
firm’s performance in corporate governance vis-a-vis its 
industry peers. Again, higher Industry CGQs imply better 
governance. 
The third independent variable of interest is a variable I 
created that assigns one point for each component of the 
INDEXCGQ that is related to what I characterize as internal 
governance (ISSINTERNAL).185 Firms with more 
purportedly high-quality internal governance mechanisms 
have higher ISSINTERNAL scores. Professor Klausner’s 
caution on simply counting governance mechanisms186 is 
well-taken. However, since I am measuring investor 
preferences for particular types of mechanisms and not using 
the metric to make claims about the quality of governance, I 
believe the use of this variable is appropriate. 
The fourth independent variable of interest is the 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell E-Index score (EINDEX). As 
described in Part II.C, this popular external governance 
metric assigns points to antitakeover defenses used by firms 
(e.g., poison pill, classified board).187 A maximum of six points 
is available. Under this rating system, firms with the lowest 
scores are considered to have the best external governance 
structure. 
The fifth independent variable of interest is the Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick G-Index score (GINDEX). As described in 
Part II.C, this well-known metric assigns points to firms for 
each characteristic that reduces the level of “shareholder 
rights.” These rights are typically associated with 
 
185 See infra Appendix B for a list of these components. 
186 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
187 See infra Appendix C.  
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antitakeover provisions.188 Thus, firms with a higher level of 
shareholder rights are, under this theory, the most 
disciplined because they are the ones that are most exposed 
to the market for corporate control. As with the EINDEX, 
low scores are purportedly indicative of high-quality external 
governance. 
The sixth independent variable of interest is a variable I 
created that assigns one point for each component of the 
INDEXCGQ that is related to what I characterize as external 
governance (ISSEXTERNAL).189 Firms with purportedly 
high-quality external governance have higher 
ISSEXTERNAL scores. 
The seventh independent variable of interest relates to 
the presence of a classified or staggered board 
(ANNDIRELEC), represented by a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the firm has annual director elections (no staggered 
board) or 0 if the firm does not have annual director 
elections. As discussed in Part II.C, the absence of a 
staggered board is generally considered a sign of high-quality 
external governance. 
I also control for a number of factors that can affect 
institutional investor ownership. The first control variable is 
Delaware incorporation (DEINC), represented by a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in the state of 
Delaware or 0 if the firm is not. There is evidence that 
suggests Delaware law is value enhancing.190 Implicit in this 
finding is that Delaware law is superior and accords with 
sophisticated investor preferences. In addition, in a sample of 
California-based firms re-incorporating in Delaware, 
Professors Murali Jagannathan and Adam Pritchard find 
that incorporation in Delaware is associated with higher 
institutional ownership.191 Professors Jagannathan and 
 
188 See infra Appendix D.  
189 See infra Appendix E for a list of these components. 
190 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. 
FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001). 
191 Murali Jagannathan & A.C. Pritchard, Do Delaware CEOs Get 
Fired? 21–22 (June 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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Pritchard suggest that this finding means that firms 
incorporated in Delaware are more likely to attract 
institutional investors.192 
The second control variable is the incidence of an 
accounting restatement due to irregularities (IRRREST) in 
the one-year period prior to March 31, 2010, represented by a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has restated its 
financial reports because of misconduct during this period or 
0 if the firm has not. Professors Karen Hennes, Andrew 
Leone, and Brian Miller define a restatement involving an 
irregularity as one in which (1) the firm itself describes its 
restatement using the words “fraud” or “irregularity,” (2) 
there is a related SEC or Department of Justice 
investigation, or (3) there is a related independent 
investigation (e.g., by an independent forensic accounting 
firm). Prior research suggests that the presence of these 
factors is indicative of a higher likelihood of misconduct 
rather than unintentional errors.193 I employ this control 
variable because there is evidence of a relationship between 
restatements and institutional ownership. For example, 
Professors Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia, and Marc Lipson find 
that institutional ownership is positively associated with the 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1313274, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q58U-Z5G5. 
192 Id. 
193 Professors Hennes, Leone, and Miller acknowledge the possibility 
for misclassification (e.g., the possibility that there are irregularities that 
firms do not describe as such or for which no SEC or independent 
investigation is conducted or the possibility that there are SEC or 
independent investigations conducted that conclude no deliberate 
misconduct occurred), but assert that they believe such misclassifications 
are rare. Karen M. Hennes, Andrew J. Leone & Brian P. Miller, The 
Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement 
Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover, 83 ACCT. 
REV. 1487, 1489 (2008), cited in Natasha Burns et al., Institutional 
Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial Reporting, 16 J. 
CORP. FIN. 443, 444 (2010). Because, in untabulated results, I use both the 
entire population of restatements and the narrowe r subset of irregularity 
restatements and get virtually the same results qualitatively, potential 
misclassifications are of limited importance to this study’s overall 
conclusions. 
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likelihood of a firm misreporting its earnings and the 
magnitude of the misreporting.194 The researchers attribute 
this effect to: (1) the presence of institutional investors with 
short investment time horizons that fail to engage in 
effective corporate monitoring;195 and (2) managers being 
under greater pressure to manage earnings (i.e., smooth 
earnings, perhaps to an extent requiring misstatement) to 
satisfy demanding, transient investors that will quickly sell 
their stock in the face of underperformance.196 
Control variables furthermore include market 
capitalization as of March 31, 2010 (SIZE), and average daily 
trading volume during the one-year period prior to March 31, 
2010 (VOL), because larger, more liquid firms are more likely 
to attract institutional shareholder interest.197 I also control 
for the influence of research analysts on institutional 
investor investment decisions with two variables: (1) 
research coverage, defined as the number of analysts that 
publish earnings estimates on a firm during the one-year 
period prior to March 31, 2010 (RESCOV); and (2) research 
activity, defined as the number of published earnings 
estimates for a firm during the one-year period prior to 
March 31, 2010 (RESACT). 
 
194 Burns et al., supra note 193, at 444. 
195 Id. The effect is mitigated, however, by ownership concentration by 
such institutions. Large ownership stakes provide more incentive to 
monitor. Id 
196 Id. at 452. Burns et al. also consider, but then dismiss, the 
possibility that institutional ownership is positively associated with 
restatements because (1) institutions can facilitate the discovery of 
financial improprieties leading to restatement announcements, or (2) 
institutions are attracted to “momentum” stocks with managers who have 
a tendency to engage in aggressive accounting practices. Id. at 454. 
197 See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2009) (“Almost all large institutional investors are 
confined to making investments in large cap corporations. Either their own 
charters or government regulations limit their ability to buy stock in small 
companies because of minimum size and maximum ownership 
requirements. Moreover, most small cap stocks have thin floats, so any 
attempt to buy a significant number of shares in a small cap company 
could move the price of that stock higher instantly, making such 
investment no longer attractive.”). 
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I control for company diversity (DIVERSE), which I 
calculate as the number of industries (determined by four-
digit SIC code) in which the firm operates, because 
diversified conglomerates may be less attractive investments 
for individual investors due to the greater difficulty in 
understanding and valuing the businesses of such firms. 
I use firm news coverage (NEWSCOV) as another control 
variable because Professors Brad Barber and Terrance 
Odean find that retail investors are attracted to attention-
grabbing stocks, which include those with significant press 
coverage.198 News coverage data were obtained by hand 
counting the number of days during the one-year period prior 
to March 31, 2010, on which a firm was featured prominently 
(i.e., its name appears either in the headline or lead 
paragraph) in a ProQuest news story. Using number of days 
of coverage instead of total number of news stories avoids the 
counting of virtually identical stories that may appear in the 
news on the same day. 
I also control for stock price (STKPRC), defined as a 
firm’s stock price as of March 31, 2010, because cost concerns 
and a desire to achieve diversification with limited 
investment funds may lead retail investors to prefer stocks 
trading at low absolute levels.199 
In addition, I employ a number of controls that may be 
related to investor preferences: (1) firm age (AGE), defined as 
the number of months the firm has appeared in the CRSP 
database as of March 31, 2010, because institutions may 
prefer to invest in older, more established firms; (2) stock 
volatility (STKVOL), defined as the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the one-year period prior to 
 
198 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of 
Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional 
Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 785, 788 (2008). 
199 See Gustavo Grullon, George Kanatas & James P. Weston, 
Advertising, Breadth of Ownership, and Liquidity, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 439, 
449 (2004); Ravi Dhar et al., The Impact of Clientele Changes: Evidence 
from Stock Splits (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410104, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JUH6-26VV. 
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March 31, 2010, because there is evidence that institutional 
ownership is associated with higher stock volatility for 
dividend-paying stocks and with lower volatility for non-
dividend payers;200 (3) return on equity (RETONEQ),201 
because profitable firms are better able to attract investment 
from institutional investors and there is evidence that firms 
with higher levels of institutional ownership have higher 
return on equity ratios;202 (4) dividends-to-equity 
(DIVTOEQ)203 because evidence shows that certain types of 
investors, including tax-exempt institutions and individuals 
with low marginal tax rates, prefer stocks that pay 
dividends;204 (5) a variable related to asset tangibility—the 
 
200 See Amir Rubin & Daniel R. Smith, Institutional Ownership, 
Volatility and Dividends, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 627, 627 (2009) (discussing 
the reasons why the relationship between institutional ownership and 
volatility differs by dividend payment status). 
201 RETONEQ equals earnings divided by book equity. “Earnings” is 
income before extraordinary items plus income statement deferred taxes 
minus preferred dividends. “Book equity” is stockholders’ equity plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes. All accounting-related calculations are as of 
the latest twelve months (“LTM”) or most recent available quarter, as of 
the quarter prior to March 31, 2010, because that is the financial data that 
would have been available to investors as of March 31, 2010. If LTM data 
are unavailable for a firm, I substitute the most recent fiscal year’s data. 
202 See, e.g., Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Institutional Investors, Financial 
Health, and Equity Valuation, 17 ASIA-PAC. J. ACCT & ECON. 151, 152 
(2010). 
203 DIVTOEQ equals dividends divided by book equity. “Dividends” 
are the dividends per share at the ex date times shares outstanding 
divided by book equity, see supra note 201. 
204 It should be noted that the evidence on dividend clienteles is 
mixed. See John R. Graham & Alok Kumar, Do Dividend Clienteles Exist? 
Evidence on Dividend Preferences of Retail Investors, 61 J. FIN. 1305, 1306 
(2006), for a discussion of multiple studies finding the presence of an 
institutional investor dividend clientele, survey evidence revealing a 
perception by financial executives of retail investor preferences for 
dividends and less conclusive direct evidence on retail investor dividend 
preferences. Graham and Kumar find that, as a group, the retail investors 
in their study (which used data from a discount brokerage house’s retail 
accounts) appear to prefer non-dividend paying firms, but that within that 
group of individual investors, low-income and older investors tend to 
prefer stocks that pay dividends. Id. at 1307. 
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ratio of tangible assets to total assets (TANGASSETS)205—
because there is evidence that institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with leverage206 and that firms with 
more tangible assets have greater access to external 
finance;207 and (6) two variables to proxy for characteristics 
indicating high growth opportunities—most recent annual 
sales growth (SALESG)208 and the ratio of book value to 
market value (BKTOMKT)209—because there is evidence that 
firms with high growth potential may be more attractive to 
institutional investors.210 The book-to-market ratio also 
proxies for firm undervaluation, which can affect not only 
institutional investment preferences, but also a firm’s 
 
205 TANGASSETS equals property, plant and equipment (Compustat 
Item 7) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6). 
206 Roni Michaely & Christopher Vincent, Do Institutional Investors 
Influence Capital Structure Decisions? 4–5 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://home.business.utah.edu/finmh/ 
Institutional.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2S68-MEX9 (describing the 
reasons for the relationship between institutional ownership and debt). 
207 This is because the availability of hard assets increases the 
amount that can be captured by creditors in case of default. Heitor 
Almeida & Murillo Campello, Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility, 
and Corporate Investment, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1429, 1430 (2007). 
208 SALESG is the change in net sales from 2008 to 2009 divided by 
2008 net sales. 
209 BKTOMKT equals book equity, see supra note 201, divided by 
market equity (Compustat stock price * Compustat shares outstanding). A 
lower book-to-market ratio, which compares book value (accounting value 
of net assets) to equity market value, implies higher growth opportunities. 
210 Professors Dan Dhaliwal, Oliver Zhen Li, and Hong Xie find that 
higher levels of institutional ownership are associated with lower book-to-
market ratios. Dhaliwal et al., supra note 202, at 167. These results are at 
odds with those of Professors Paul Gompers and Andrew Metrick who find 
that institutional ownership is positively associated with book-to-market 
ratio. Dhaliwal et al., supra note 202, at 167 n.5 (citing Paul A. Gompers & 
Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q. J. ECON. 
229, 244 (2001)). In the present study, in some specifications, consistent 
with Professors Gompers and Metrick, I find the relationship between 
level of institutional ownership and book-to-market ratio to be positive, 
which suggests that firms with high growth opportunities may garner 
more attention in the financial press and on investment blogs and thereby 
attract more retail, rather than institutional, investor interest. 
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vulnerability to hostile takeover.211 The latter has 
implications for institutional tolerance of antitakeover 
mechanisms. 
Finally, I control for membership in the S&P 500 (SP500). 
Many mutual funds pursue index fund strategies. Because of 
data limitations, I am unable to disentangle the actively-
managed portions of a mutual fund’s holdings from the 
indexed portion. Therefore, I control for membership in the 
S&P 500 as of March 31, 2010, to avoid spurious 
correlations. (See Table 1 for summary data and Table 2 for 
pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables used in this 
study.) 
Following Professors Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey 
Wurgler,212 I winsorize the institutional ownership variable 
and all the control variables that are not dummy variables at 
their 0.5% and 99.5% values as a check against outliers and 
influential data points. Regression diagnostics reveal 
problems with a number of my variables. To correct for 
deficiencies, I express the size, trading volume, research 
coverage, research activity, news coverage, age, volatility, 
asset tangibility, and stock price variables in natural 
logarithms. I also perform principal component analysis to 
address multicollinearity problems and subsequently 
generate one new variable (SIZEVOLRES) for use in my 
regression analyses that combines SIZE (market 
capitalization), VOL (trading volume), RESCOV (research 
coverage) and RESACT (research activity) into one variable. 
I compare institutional ownership levels with seven 
different governance metrics. My first regression 
specification takes the form: 
INSTOWN =  + INDEXCGQi +γ1DEINCi +γ2IRRRESTi 
+γ3SIZEVOLRESi +γ4DIVERSEi + γ5NEWSCOVi + γ6AGEi + 
γ7STKVOLi + γ8RETONEQi + γ9DIVTOEQi + 
 
211 See 13D Monitor, supra note 211 (discussing how undervaluation 
may make a firm vulnerable to hostile takeover). 
212 Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor Sentiment and the 
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 61 J. FIN. 1645, 1655 (2006). 
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γ10TANGASSETSi + γ11STKPRCi + γ12SALESGi + 
γ13BKTOMKTi + γ14SP500i + εi 
where INSTOWN is the variable representing the proportion 
of a firm’s stock held by institutional investors; INDEXCGQ 
is the ISS Index CGQ; DEINC is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms incorporated in Delaware and 0 
otherwise; IRRREST is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for firms with a past accounting restatement due 
to irregularities and 0 otherwise; SIZEVOLRES is a 
combination of market capitalization, trading volume, 
research coverage, and research activity; DIVERSE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that 
operate in more than two industries and 0 otherwise; 
NEWSCOV is the number of days of news coverage during 
the study period; AGE is firm age; STKVOL represents stock 
volatility; RETONEQ is return on equity; DIVTOEQ is 
dividends-to-equity; TANGASSETS is the ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets; STKPRC is stock price; SALESG is 
sales growth; BKTOMKT is book-to-market ratio; and SP500 
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is a member 
of the S&P 500 and 0 otherwise. 
In model specification (2), INDUSCGQ, the ISS Industry 
CGQ, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification (3), 
ISSINTERNAL, the components of ISS’ Index CGQ that 
relate to internal governance, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model 
specification (4), EINDEX, the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
E-Index score, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification 
(5), GINDEX,213 the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick G-Index 
score, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification (6), 
ISSEXTERNAL, the components of ISS’ Index CGQ that 
relate primarily to external governance, replaces 
INDEXCGQ. In model specification (7), ANNDIRELEC, 
which represents the absence of a staggered board, replaces 
INDEXCGQ. 
Table 3 reports the results of these regressions, including 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics, and robust standard 
 
213 G-Index scores are not available after 2007, so the G-Index 
regression is as of March 31, 2007. 
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errors, and shows that governance metrics that are 
exclusively or largely internally focused (INDEXCGQ, 
INDUSCGQ, and ISSINTERNAL) are positively associated 
with institutional ownership. The results are statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.01, 0.01, and 0.1 for INDEXCGQ, 
INDUSGGQ, and ISSINTERNAL, respectively) and 
economically significant.214 A one standard deviation 
increase in INDEXCGQ, INDUSCGQ, and ISSINTERNAL is 
associated with a 1.6%, 2.2%, and 1.0% increase in 
institutional ownership, respectively. An increase in the 
quality of governance as measured by INDEXCGQ from the 
25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with an 
increase in institutional ownership of 4.0%.215 A similar 
governance quality increase with respect to INDUSCGQ and 
ISSINTERNAL is associated with a 5.9% and 4.0% increase 
in institutional ownership, respectively. 
I also find that ANNDIRELEC (annual director elections) 
is associated with higher levels of institutional ownership (p-
value < 0.1). I find no statistically significant relationship 
between three measures of external governance—EINDEX, 
 
214 Given the trillions of dollars under management by institutional 
investors, even seemingly small percentage changes in institutional 
ownership can represent sizable sums. In addition, evidence on reverse 
stock splits may prove useful in this context. Firms often do reverse stock 
splits to raise a company’s absolute stock price in order to attract 
institutional investors. According to one study, in the two-year period 
before the initiation of a reverse stock split, institutional investment 
declined, on average, by 1.3%. Kee H. Chung & Sean Yang, Reverse Stock 
Splits, Institutional Holdings, and Share Value 41 tbl.I (Oct. 1, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785774, archived at http://perma.cc/XR22-TWFQ. 
If a 1.3% decline can induce, at least in part, firms to undergo a reverse 
stock split in hopes of attracting institutional investment dollars, then it is 
fair to say that a 1.0%–5.9% difference in institutional investment is 
economically significant. 
215 Consistent with Professors Kee Chung and Hao Zhang, I calculate 
this as follows: (OLS Estimated Regression Coefficient on Index CGQ (see 
Table 3, column 1) * (75th percentile value of Index CGQ – 25th percentile 
value of Index CGQ))/Mean Overall Institutional Ownership of Sample 
Firms in Regression Equation. See Chung & Zhang, supra note 16, at 255 
n.11. 
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GINDEX, and ISSEXTERNAL––and INSTOWN 
(institutional ownership). However, this finding (and other 
such findings as described below) does not mean no 
relationship exists, only that my data do not allow me to 
draw any empirically sound conclusions about the nature of 
the relationship among these variables. 
To assess whether the relationship between institutional 
ownership and governance quality varies by institution type, 
I perform the regression analyses described above and 
replace the dependent variable institutional ownership with 
the following: bank ownership; insurance company 
ownership; investment company (mutual fund) ownership; 
corporate (private) pension fund ownership; public pension 
fund ownership; university and foundation endowment 
ownership; and other institutional ownership (which 
includes hedge funds). Table 4 reports the results of these 
regressions, including heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics 
and robust standard errors, and shows that higher quality 
governance as measured by INDEXCGQ is positively 
associated not only with INSTOWN (overall institutional 
ownership) (p-value < 0.01), but also with level of mutual 
fund ownership (p-value < 0.01) and bank ownership (p-value 
< 0.05). However, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between INDEXCGQ and any other type of 
institutional ownership. 
Higher quality governance measured by INDUSCGQ is 
positively associated not only with overall institutional 
ownership (p-value < 0.01), but also with level of bank 
ownership (p-value < 0.05), mutual fund ownership (p-value 
< 0.01), and public pension fund ownership (p-value < 0.1). 
This suggests that banks, mutual funds, and public pension 
funds prefer firms with high-quality, internally focused 
corporate governance relative to their industry peers. I find 
no statistically significant relationship between INDUSCGQ 
and insurance company ownership, corporate pension fund 
ownership, university and foundation endowment ownership, 
or ownership by other types of institutional investors. High-
quality governance as measured by ISSINTERNAL is 
positively associated with overall institutional ownership (p-
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value < 0.1) and bank ownership (p-value < 0.1). I find no 
statistically significant relationship between ISSINTERNAL 
and any other type of institutional ownership. Combined, 
these results suggest that the preference for internal 
governance mechanisms is shared broadly across institution 
types. 
The results of the regression analysis for the measures of 
external governance differ significantly from those related to 
internal governance. Higher levels of ownership by insurance 
companies (p-value < 0.05) and public pension funds (p-value 
< 0.01) are associated with lower quality external governance 
(i.e., lower vulnerability to the market for corporate control), 
as measured by GINDEX. (Recall that the lower the 
EINDEX and GINDEX, the better the external corporate 
governance is assumed to be.) I find no statistically 
significant relationship between GINDEX and INSTOWN 
(overall institutional ownership), bank ownership, mutual 
fund ownership, corporate pension fund ownership, 
university and foundation endowment ownership, or other 
institutional ownership. I also find a positive relationship (p-
value < 0.05) between bank ownership and EINDEX, again, 
a sign of poor quality external governance. Otherwise, I find 
no statistically significant relationship between EINDEX or 
ISSEXTERNAL and institutional ownership of any other 
type. Taken together, these results seem to suggest that, to 
the extent there is an institutional preference, it is for 
internal governance mechanisms over external governance 
mechanisms. 
However, I find one area in which there appears to be an 
overall institutional preference for high-quality external 
corporate governance: annual director elections. Both overall 
institutional ownership (p-value < 0.1) and mutual fund 
ownership (p-value < 0.05) are associated with higher quality 
external governance as measured by the absence of a 
staggered board. No statistically significant relationship 
exists between ownership by banks, insurance companies, 
private pension funds, public pension funds, university and 
foundation endowments, or other institutions and the 
absence of a staggered board. This suggests that the 
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association between overall institutional ownership and the 
seeming preference for non-staggered boards 
(ANNDIRELEC) described previously is largely driven by 
mutual funds. This is not surprising because mutual fund 
ownership is, on average, approximately 45% of the total 
ownership of the firms in my sample and dwarfs the 
percentage ownership of other types of institutional 
investors. 
The preceding analysis treats internal governance and 
external governance as separate categories of corporate 
governance. However, it is possible that internal governance 
and external governance are related in such a way that 
merits a joint review of the two types of governance devices. 
Internal and external governance may be substitutes for one 
another (i.e., low-quality governance of one type can be made 
up for by high-quality governance of another type). A study 
performed by Professors Stuart Gillan, Jay Hartzell, and 
Laura Starks provides an example of governance 
substitution by showing that firms that are less vulnerable 
to takeovers have higher levels of board independence.216 
Internal governance and external governance also can 
function as complements. Professors Martijn Cremers and 
Vinay Nair find that high-quality external governance is 
associated with a statistically significant annualized 
abnormal return of 10–15% only when coupled with a large 
blockholder or high levels of public pension fund ownership, 
which the researchers consider indicia of high-quality 
internal governance.217 They suggest that this 
complementarity can lead to higher value in at least one 
scenario: the presence of a large shareholder can be crucial to 
facilitating a successful takeover attempt. This suggests that 
firms that lack a large monitoring shareholder may not be 
taken over, even if they have no antitakeover devices in 
effect.218 
 
216 Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Tradeoffs in 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board Structures and Charter 
Provisions, 1 Q. J. FIN. 667, 668 (2011). 
217 Cremers & Nair, supra note 13, at 2862. 
218 Id. at 2860. 
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To test whether internal corporate governance quality 
interacts with external governance quality to predict level of 
institutional ownership, I perform a regression analysis 
using INDEXCGQ; transformed EINDEX variable, 
REVEINDEX;219 and INDEXCGQ*REVEINDEX as the 
independent variables of interest. Prior to creating a variable 
to represent the interaction of INDEXCGQ and 
REVEINDEX, I center220 the variables INDEXCGQ and 
REVEINDEX by subtracting the sample mean from each 
variable’s value. In untabulated results, I find that there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship (p < 0.05) 
between INSTOWN (institutional ownership) and 
INDEXCGQ (high-quality (primarily) internal governance), 
but no statistically significant relationship between 
INSTOWN (institutional ownership) and high-quality 
external governance (REVEINDEX) or between the 
interaction term INDEXCGQ*REVEINDEX and INSTOWN 
(institutional ownership). These results suggest that, from 
the perspective of institutional investors, internal and 
external corporate governance are not substitutes (e.g., poor 
internal governance is fine only if there is strong external 
governance) and that the efficacy or attractiveness of 
internal governance is not dependent on external governance 
or vice-versa. 
 
219 Because of the necessity of generating an interaction term for 
INDEXCGQ and EINDEX, I transformed EINDEX to REVEINDEX by 
subtracting the value of EINDEX from the number six. Six is the highest 
possible EINDEX score, and higher EINDEX scores denote poor external 
governance. Because high INDEXCGQ scores indicate good internal 
governance, I transformed EINDEX to REVEINDEX so that a higher, 
rather than a lower, external governance score also would represent good 
governance. 
220 REBECCA M. WARNER, APPLIED STATISTICS: FROM BIVARIATE 
THROUGH MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 632 (2d. ed. 2013) (“The purpose of 
centering is to reduce the correlation between the product [interaction] 
term and the X1, X2 scores, so that the effects of the X1 and X2 predictors 
are distinguishable from the interaction.”). 
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2. Pooled OLS Regression Analysis 
  As an additional tool to assess the relationship 
between corporate governance and institutional ownership, I 
perform pooled OLS regression analysis using the period 
2002–2010. The 2010 OLS regression analysis affords me an 
opportunity to assess whether firms with high-quality 
corporate governance have higher levels of institutional 
ownership as of a fairly recent single point in time (i.e., 
March 31, 2010). Employing pooled OLS regression analysis, 
which uses multiple observations from the same firm over 
time, provides an added benefit over the 2010 OLS cross-
sectional regression analysis because it examines the 
relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance quality over a multi-year period. 
I use annual corporate governance data from 2002, the 
year of the launch of the ISS CGQ, to 2010, the year in which 
ISS discontinued publication of CGQ’s.221 The dependent 
variable is institutional ownership. I compare institutional 
ownership levels with seven different governance metrics––
INDEXCGQ, INDUSCGQ, ISSINTERNAL,222 EINDEX, 
GINDEX (through the last year of available data, 2007), 
ISSEXTERNAL,223 and ANNDIRELEC (no staggered board). 
In the pooled OLS regressions, I employ the same control 
 
221 The precise dates of the data used in the analysis are September 
30, 2002, the first date on which CGQ data were published (outside of 
publication in a pilot program on December 31, 2001); March 31, 2003; 
March 31, 2004; March 31, 2005; March 31, 2006; March 31, 2007; March 
31, 2008; March 31, 2009; and March 31, 2010. 
222 ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL are generated by summing 
the number of internal or external governance best practices, respectively, 
employed by a firm. The CGQ factors changed slightly in 2006 and then 
again in 2007. Thus, to have comparable metrics over the 2002–2010 study 
period, I converted ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL to percentage 
scores (ISSINTERNALPERC and ISSEXTERNALPERC) that reflect the 
percentage of ISS-defined best practices employed by each firm in my 
sample. Using ISSINTERNALPERC and ISSEXTERNALPERC in place of 
ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL does not change my results 
qualitatively. 
223 See supra note 222. 
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variables, as of the relevant time period, as were used in the 
2010 OLS regression analysis.224 
In my analysis, I cluster at the firm level. Within a single 
regression, assuming no missing data, each firm yields nine 
observations (one for each data point in the years 2002-
2010), which leads to clustered errors due to correlation 
among observations within each firm. Failure to cluster at 
the firm level can lead to incorrect standard errors and 
incorrect inferences about the strength of the relationship 
between corporate governance and institutional ownership. I 
also employ year fixed effects (i.e., I control for factors 
occurring in any time period––for example, overall public 
pension fund investment in 2007) that could affect 
institutional ownership. 
Table 5 reports the results of these pooled OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. Consistent with the 2010 OLS analysis, there is a 
positive relationship between INSTOWN (overall 
 
224 All accounting-related calculations are as of the latest twelve 
months (“LTM”) or the most recent available quarter, as of the quarter 
prior to March 31 of the relevant year, or in the case of 2002, prior to 
September 30. If LTM data are unavailable for a firm, I substitute the 
most recent fiscal year’s data. Irregularity restatement history is limited 
to restatements that occurred post-SOX. I focus on restatements post-SOX 
because these restatements may be, in part, a reflection of the internal 
control requirements imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Prentice & Spence, 
supra note 79, at 1871. Given the perceived permissiveness of auditing 
firms pre-SOX, Professors Prentice and Spence argue that a pre-SOX 
restatement is “a sign that management had been busted by its auditor for 
stretching numbers beyond all bounds of plausibility.” Id. Post-SOX, with 
the heightened focus on financial control, restatements could be perceived 
as an example of a company “trying to get [its financial reporting] right.” 
Id. Rep. Paul Sarbanes agrees that “[w]hereas before the passage of the 
legislation the escalating number of restatements was a danger sign, the 
numbers today indicate that the internal control requirements are having 
the desired effect.” Paul Sarbanes, Living Up to Its Promise Sarbanes-
Oxley Pays Dividends by Keeping Companies Honest, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (Denver), Apr. 8, 2006, at 2C, cited in Prentice & Spence, supra note 
79, at 1871 n.136. Investors seem to make this pre- and post-SOX 
distinction, as firm stock prices declined on average 10% following a pre-
SOX restatement, but only 2% following a post-SOX restatement. Prentice 
& Spence, supra note 79, at 1871 n.136. 
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institutional ownership) and high-quality internal corporate 
governance, as measured by INDEXCGQ (p-value < 0.05), 
INDUSCGQ (p-value < 0.01), and ISSINTERNAL (p-value < 
0.01). The analysis also reveals a statistically significant 
positive relationship (p-value < 0.1) between INSTOWN 
(overall institutional ownership) and GINDEX. This suggests 
an overall institutional preference for low-quality external 
governance as measured by the G-Index. I find no 
statistically significant relationship between any other 
external governance quality measure and overall 
institutional ownership. 
Table 6 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions that 
explore the relationships between corporate governance 
metrics and institutional ownership by type of institution. 
My analysis reveals that in addition to INSTOWN (overall 
institutional ownership) (p-value < 0.01), mutual fund (p-
value < 0.05), bank (p-value < 0.05), and insurance company 
(p-value < 0.01) ownership are positively associated with 
INDEXCGQ. Similarly, mutual fund (p-value < 0.01), bank 
(p-value < 0.01), insurance company (p-value < 0.01), public 
pension fund (p-value < 0.01), and other institutional 
ownership (p-value < 0.1) have a statistically significant 
positive relationship with INDUSCGQ. These results, 
combined with the positive relationship I find between 
ISSINTERNAL and mutual fund (p-value < 0.1), bank (p-
value < 0.01), insurance company (p-value < 0.01), public 
pension fund (p-value < 0.01), and corporate pension fund 
ownership (p-value < 0.1), suggest a preference by almost all 
institutional investor types for purportedly high-quality 
internal governance. 
I also find a positive relationship (p-value < 0.1) between 
mutual fund ownership and ANNDIRELEC (annual director 
elections). This suggests that mutual fund managers are 
attracted to firms that do not have staggered boards. This 
stands in stark contrast to the negative relationship (p-value 
< 0.01) I find between public pension fund ownership and 
ANNDIRELEC. Ownership by public pension funds is 
associated not only with low-quality external governance in 
the form of a staggered board, but also, in the form of higher 
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EINDEX (p-value < 0.01), higher GINDEX (p-value < 0.01), 
and lower ISSEXTERNAL (p-value < 0.01). The pooled OLS 
analysis suggests a preference on the part of public pension 
funds for high-quality internal governance and weak 
external governance. Ownership by insurance companies and 
banks is also associated with low-quality external 
governance, as both types of institutional ownership have 
negative relationships with ISSEXTERNAL (p-value < 0.05 
and < 0.01, respectively) and positive relationships with 
EINDEX (p-value < 0.1 and < 0.05, respectively) and 
GINDEX (p-value < 0.01 and < 0.05, respectively). 
In this study, I have explored the question of institutional 
preferences in corporate governance. Though mixed, the 
weight of the evidence suggests, overall, that institutions 
prefer high-quality internal governance over high-quality 
external governance. 
3. Causation 
The foregoing analysis provides a useful framework for 
understanding the relationship between particular 
governance practices and institutional ownership. Even 
though the results demonstrate that particular governance 
metrics are associated with institutional ownership, given 
the econometric technique I use (OLS regression), I can make 
no causal claims. However, the evidence presented is 
strongly suggestive of the fact that either institutions are 
attracted to firms with certain governance characteristics or 
the presence of institutional investors leads firms to adopt 
such mechanisms – or both.225 Either way, assuming I have 
controlled for potentially confounding factors, finding 
associations between particular governance metrics and 
higher levels of institutional ownership suggests these 
metrics generally measure governance characteristics that 
are consistent with institutional preferences. 
 
225 Evidence suggests both can be true. See, e.g., Bushee, Carter & 
Gerakos, supra note 17, at 4–5 (discussing evidence on institutional 
preferences for pre-existing governance characteristics and shareholder 
activism). 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR FINDINGS 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Review of Alternatives 
The results of this study suggest that, like Congress, 
institutional investors are largely unconcerned with 
investing in companies with governance mechanisms 
“proven” to enhance firm performance. There are a number 
of potential conclusions one could draw about these seeming 
preferences. 
1. Misinformed or Irrational Investors 
This study could demonstrate that institutional investors 
are just as misinformed and inept as members of Congress 
are alleged to be: institutions have a preference for internal 
governance mechanisms because they are holding on to 
governance-related “myths” and “superstitions” that bear no 
relationship to reality.226 This is certainly possible, but it 
seems unlikely. It is standard procedure in the finance and 
corporate law literatures to study stock market reactions to 
changes in laws or policies—that is, to engage in event 
studies.227 Researchers do this because of the prevailing view 
that stock price movements following legal changes tell us 
something useful about the efficacy of a new law or policy. 
During the time of this study, institutional trading in NYSE 
 
226 See supra Part II.B (describing the views of Professor Jeffrey 
Sonnenfeld who argues that the factors considered in generating corporate 
governance ratings are largely the product of “Wall Street superstitions” 
and “clichés and myths, rather than . . . genuine research”). 
227 See generally Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder 
Proxy Access Damage Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2012) (“The three-part mandate of promoting 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, combined with the D.C. 
Circuit’s willingness to overturn SEC rules that lack sufficient empirical 
foundation, has undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of SEC rules as 
targets of empirical study. Stock price event studies have been the most 
popular method for commentators considering the effect of events that 
alter the probability that proxy access legislation or rules would be 
implemented.”). 
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stocks represented 98–99% of all trades, so the views of 
institutions, not retail traders, are clearly those being sought 
by researchers. If researchers routinely attribute significant 
meaning to investors’ short-term (sometimes as little as one-
day) stock price reactions, which represent short-term 
buying and selling following a significant announcement, it 
seems reasonable to attribute meaning to institutions’ 
governance preferences as revealed in the present study. 
Relatedly, this study’s results could demonstrate that 
institutions are not generally irrational actors, but were 
acting irrationally during the study period in reaction to fear 
caused by large-scale market scandals. That explanation, 
too, seems unlikely. In unreported results for an OLS 
regression analysis using data as of March 31, 2005 only, I 
generally find the same relationships as those described in 
this paper. The year 2005 is three years after the Enron 
scandal and three years prior to the financial crisis. Thus, 
this is a time period far removed (in Wall Street terms) from 
the scandals that could lead to fear-induced preferences. 
2. Agendas Unrelated to Wealth Maximization 
The preference for governance mechanisms with mixed 
empirical support could mean that institutional investors 
have an agenda unrelated to maximization of shareholder 
welfare. Such charges have been leveled, for example, 
against public pension funds. Professor Bainbridge, for 
example, attributes the passage of what he views as the 
misguided mandate for 100% compensation committee 
independence to union and public pension fund advocacy.228 
There is no doubt that institutional investors are not a 
monolithic group and have varying preferences. However, 
the findings in this study, to the extent I find a statistically 
significant relationship, are generally consistent across all 
institutional types. My pooled OLS analysis shows that not 
only public pension funds, but, in general, all institutional 
investors prefer purportedly high-quality internal 
governance, despite the fact that the evidence with respect to 
 
228 See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1816. 
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efficacy is mixed at best. There is no reason to believe that 
all institutional investors, including mutual funds, banks, 
and insurance companies, are motivated by political 
considerations over return maximization. As I more fully 
discuss in Part IV.B.1, infra, shareholders may make the 
decision to invest in firms with high-quality internal 
governance because they believe in the common sense 
intuition that independence from management is helpful in 
circumstances such as setting CEO compensation and 
auditing financial statements prepared by management. It 
may turn out that these investors are wrong, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that they are making this choice because 
they are indifferent to firm profitability. 
Also, there is no evidence that public pension funds are 
more likely than other investor types to advocate for 
corporate policies that that they believe would depress 
returns and be adverse to the financial interests of their 
beneficiaries. Indeed, the available evidence shows that 
pension funds consistently outperform mutual funds, and 
this is after accounting for the different cost structures of the 
two types of institutions.229 
3. Blind Herding 
The relationship between institutional ownership, on the 
one hand, and high-quality internal governance and poor-
quality external governance, on the other hand, simply could 
be a reflection of the fact that institutions are lemmings that 
blindly follow ISS because investment managers are too lazy 
(or feel ill-equipped) to make their own assessments about 
 
229 After comparing the returns of 716 defined benefit pension plans 
and 4,030 mutual funds over the 1992–2004 time period, Professors Rob 
Bauer and Rik Frehen find that the “pension funds outperform mutual 
funds by approximately 250 basis points per year. After size-matching the 
mutual fund sample, differences are reduced to roughly 150 basis points. 
Costs are only to a minor extent responsible for the net performance 
differential. Risk and style corrections widen the performance gap to more 
than 200 basis points.” ROB BAUER & RIK FREHEN, THE PERFORMANCE OF 
US PENSION FUNDS 2–3 (2008), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/ 
show.cgi?fid=78520, archived at http://perma.cc/2RDK-CL69. 
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governance quality. However, there is evidence against ISS-
induced blind herding generally. After examining the 
relationship between shareholder votes and voting 
recommendations from proxy advisors ISS, Glass Lewis, 
Proxy Governance, and Egan Jones, Professors Steve Choi, 
Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan find that institutional investors 
do not blindly follow voting recommendations of proxy 
advisors.230 Instead, they find that recommendations from 
ISS, the most powerful proxy advisory firm, shift investor 
votes by no more than 6–10%.231 This is a material 
percentage, but still indicative of less power than 
traditionally ascribed to ISS.232 Importantly, Professors Choi, 
Fisch and Kahan find that ISS, more than other competing 
proxy advisors, bases its recommendations on the 
considerations deemed most important by their institutional 
investor clients. Thus, the researchers conclude, “ISS is not 
so much a Pied Piper followed blindly by institutional 
investors as it is an information agent and guide, helping 
investors to identify voting decisions that are consistent with 
their existing preferences.”233 Just as Professors Choi, Fisch 
and Kahan argue with respect to proxy voting, I submit that 
perhaps ISS’ governance rating methodology to a large 
extent merely reflects the pre-existing preferences of 
institutional investors. 
My study demonstrates that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between mutual fund and public 
pension fund ownership, on the one hand, and the ISS Index 
CGQ and/or ISS Industry CGQ, on the other hand. Mutual 
fund and pension fund managers, as described below in Part 
IV.A.4, have reason to follow ISS’ recommendations. That 
said, there is still reason to doubt a blind herding 
explanation for this study’s findings. According to a 2007 
report, Ashton Partners, a strategic advisory firm that 
 
230 Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 905–06 (2010). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. Press reports claim that ISS recommendations can shift as 
much as 20–30% of shareholder votes. Id. at 905. 
233 Id. at 906. 
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specializes in communications and investor relations, 
surveyed 200 portfolio managers and buy-side analysts.234 
Approximately one-third of those surveyed had never even 
heard of the ISS CGQ.235 Another third claimed to be aware 
of the CGQ236 of the firms in which they were considering 
investments, but said the corporate governance rating was 
not a factor in their investment decisions.237 It is true that 
several years have elapsed since this survey was taken. ISS’ 
profile certainly has risen since. However, in unreported 
results, I find that the positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and ISS corporate governance scores 
persists each year throughout the 2002–2010 period, which 
includes time periods before this survey was administered. 
This evidence, though admittedly limited, casts doubt on the 
presence of blind herding. 
In addition, ISS takes a decidedly negative view of 
antitakeover mechanisms, yet the evidence in this study is 
clear: higher numbers of antitakeover devices are associated 
with higher levels of institutional ownership in many cases. 
This, too, is inconsistent with blind herding. 
4. Criticism Insurance 
Another possible explanation for my finding of a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and internal 
corporate governance lies in institutional investors’ use of 
ISS ratings as “criticism insurance.” Professor Rose suggests 
that ISS’ large amount of influence is related to the fact that 
pension funds and mutual funds, pursuant to federal law, 
 
234 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, RESEARCH ANALYST VIEWS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1 (2007), available at http://www.foley.com/files/ 
Publication/d86cd0ab-94ce-4a43-9881-f0beacb1bd9a/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/59dd7bff-8711-4765-9f50-f0fff2fe73ef/Research 
AnalystViewsofCorpGov.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WC9N-F8NF. 
235 Id. 
236 The actual language in the Foley & Lardner release uses the 
generic term “corporate governance,” but from the context, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the references are to the CGQ and not to 
corporate governance more broadly. See id. 
237 Id. 
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must vote proxies in the best interests of their investors or 
beneficiaries.238 As fiduciaries, pension plan and mutual fund 
managers must conduct due diligence in connection with 
their proxy voting.239 Following the voting recommendation 
of ISS may provide “criticism insurance,” as a fund manager 
voting consistent with an ISS recommendation has “no 
burden of proof with respect to a particular proxy vote” and 
is unlikely to be found to have violated her fiduciary duties 
after following the expert advice of a proxy advisory firm.240 
One could argue that this also could be the case with 
corporate governance ratings. 
If this is the case, even if ISS’ governance metric is wrong 
about the quality of a particular firm’s governance practices 
and investing in such firm leads to investment losses from, 
say, fraud, at least an investment manager can take cover by 
pointing out that she was one of many institutions with an 
investment in the fraudster. Therefore, an investment 
manager may perceive the safest course to be one in which 
she invests in firms that have received the ISS governance 
“stamp of approval.” In other words, investing in ISS-
sanctioned companies provides a type of “criticism 
insurance.”241 
This potential explanation, too, seems unlikely. In this 
study, I assess the relationship between institutional 
ownership and a significant type of governance breakdown––
a firm’s history of accounting restatements due to 
“irregularities” (i.e., misconduct) and find, in the 2002–2010 
pooled OLS analysis, that higher proportions of institutional 
ownership are associated with a higher likelihood of prior 
restatements due to irregularities. If institutions’ apparent 
preference for internal corporate governance is driven by fear 
of fraud, it is puzzling to see a positive relationship between 
restatements due to misconduct and institutional ownership. 
This result is inconsistent with the assertion that 
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institutional investors are so frightened by the prospect of 
fraud that they would use the ISS rating as criticism 
insurance. If investment managers are worried about facing 
criticism if a portfolio company were to become involved in 
fraud, they would be less likely to invest in firms with a 
history of restatements due to irregularities.242 Surely, such 
managers would receive as much, if not more, criticism for 
investing in a company with a known history of wrongdoing 
than for investing in a firm with a comparatively low CGQ 
score. 
5. Omitted Variable Bias 
The relationship I find between governance mechanisms 
and institutional ownership could be a product of omitted 
variable bias—i.e., my model is missing a factor or factors 
related to the choice of governance mechanisms and 
institutional ownership. The use of a large number of control 
variables informed by finance theory in my analyses goes a 
long way toward addressing this concern. However, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out completely. 
 
242 Of course, this finding does not necessarily mean that institutions 
actively seek out fraudsters. There are at least two possible alternative 
explanations for this result. First, following restatements due to 
irregularities, either the CEO or CFO typically (in about 90% of the cases, 
according to one study) is removed from office in the short-term. See 
Hennes, Leone & Miller, supra note 193, at 1490. Thus, a history of 
accounting irregularities does not mean that a firm’s corporate governance 
going forward necessarily will be poor. Indeed, governance could 
conceivably improve following a management shake-up and the 
governance reforms likely to follow shareholder litigation or regulatory 
scrutiny, which would make such firms more attractive to institutions. 
Second, it is possible that the presence of a large institutional shareholder 
base makes firm managers more likely to engage in financial misreporting. 
See supra Part III.C.1, for further discussion of this final point. 
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B. Policy Implications 
1. Internal Governance 
Because I largely find all of the foregoing alternative 
explanations wanting, I am left with the conclusion that 
institutional investors prefer internal governance 
mechanisms because they believe, even in the absence of 
empirical support, that such mechanisms are value 
enhancing. This conclusion is consistent with the history of 
institutional influence on governance in the U.S. 
As Professor Jeff Gordon notes, from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-2000s, the percentage of independent directors on 
corporate boards increased substantially,243 not due to 
management-initiative, but in response to shareholder 
demand.244 Thus, Professor Gordon suggests that the move 
from advisory boards to monitoring boards was driven not by 
regulatory intervention, but rather by market forces.245 
Though it is true, as Professor Macey suggests, that the law 
in Delaware has encouraged the use of independent directors 
in situations such as evaluating hostile bids and responding 
to derivative suits, no Delaware judicial decisions have 
required that a majority of a board be independent or that a 
board perform only monitoring functions.246 Of course, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and stock exchange rules now require board 
independence, but these mandates are of fairly recent origin 
and largely reflect prevailing corporate norms.247 The most 
significant cause of the move to independent monitoring 
boards has been the market pressure imposed by 
institutional investors.248 
 
243 See Gordon, supra note 94, at 1474 fig.1, 1476. Although 
measuring a different time period, it is interesting to note that, in 1950, 
independent directors made up about 20% of the membership of a board. 
In 2005, that percentage stood at 75%. Id. at 1475. 
244 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1358. 
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Prior to the SOX mandate, 70% of public company audit 
committees were composed entirely of independent 
directors,249 and prior to the Dodd-Frank imposed stock 
exchange mandate and previous exchange requirements, 
77% of public companies had fully independent compensation 
committees.250 Of course, these outcomes cannot be 
attributed solely to institutional investor pressure,251 but it 
 
249 This figure is based on a sample of 1,269 public companies. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee independence requirement did not bring 
about a drastic change in corporate practice. In 2002, immediately prior to 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 90% of a sample of public company audit 
committee members, on average, were independent, and 70% of the public 
companies in this sample had fully independent audit committees. DUGAN 
ET AL., supra note 73, at 18–19. Note: these percentages are based on ISS 
Governance Research Service’s (“GRS”) definition of independence. This 
standard, with limited exceptions, is more stringent than the NYSE 
standard for non-affiliation and hence independence. However, there is 
substantial overlap, as, in 2005, 93% of directors were characterized 
identically as either independent or not independent by the NYSE and 
GRS. Id. at 14–15. Stock exchange rules promulgated in 1999 required 
listed firms to either have fully independent audit committees or make a 
special board determination that it was in the best interest of the company 
to have one member (out of three or more total members) be non-
independent. In 2002, 70% of boards in this sample apparently voluntarily 
determined it was in the best interest of their firms to have audit 
committees made up entirely of independent directors. Indeed, a majority 
of public companies (56%) had fully independent audit committees in 1999, 
before the effective date of the new stock exchange rules on audit 
committee independence. ERNST & YOUNG, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AT 10: 
ENHANCING THE RELIABILITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING AND AUDIT QUALITY 4 
fig. (2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/The_Sarbanes-Oxley_Act_at_10_-_Enhancing_the_reliability 
_of_financial_reporting_and_audit_quality/$FILE/JJ0003.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/E2Y5-52WL. Thus, audit committee independence in the 
absence of a regulatory mandate or encouragement was already common 
practice. 
250 See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 73. This figure is based on a sample 
of 1,269 public companies. Id. 
251 For example, part of the impetus for compensation committee 
independence is likely found in Internal Revenue Code Section 
162(m)(4)(C)(i), passed under the 1993 Tax Act, which prohibits deducting 
public company employee compensation in excess of $1,000,000 unless the 
excess compensation is earned pursuant to the achievement of 
performance goals determined by a firm’s compensation committee 
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also would be unfair to say that the move toward board 
independence was forced upon companies exclusively by 
legislative fiat. 
The available empirical evidence does suggest that 
investors prefer internal governance mechanisms. One study 
finds that investors prefer independence and tend to reward 
improved corporate governance practices.252 For example, the 
appointment of an outside, independent director is associated 
with higher follow-on stock prices than the appointment of 
an inside director.253 There is also evidence that the market 
values both board independence and audit committee 
independence. 254 One study finds that investors rewarded 
firms that voluntarily adopted these measures before they 
were subject to regulatory mandate with higher stock 
prices.255 Another study finds that the adoption of several 
SOX provisions, including those related to director 
independence, resulted in abnormal positive returns for large 
and mid-sized companies who did not previously have such 
governance characteristics.256 
Institutional investors are run by professional managers 
who are better equipped than legislators or academics to 
understand what is in their institutions’ best interests. As a 
firm’s residual claimants, they arguably bear the costs of 
poor governance and the implementation of inefficient 
governance mechanisms more so than any other corporate 
stakeholder. If institutional investors have decided that 
high-quality internal governance characteristics are 
desirable, then that judgment should be afforded significant 
weight in assessing the efficacy of these mechanisms. 
This, therefore, leads to a question: Is it fair to refer to 
legislative mandates as quackery when the mandates are 
 
composed of two or more outside directors. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i) (2013). 
See Jack S. Levin et al., Code Section 162(m) – $1 Million Deduction Limit 
on Executive Compensation, 63 TAX NOTES 723, 731 (1994). 
252 Prentice & Spence, supra note 79, at 1867. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 1878. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 1879. 
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consistent with then-existing practices of 70–80% of public 
companies and with institutional investor preferences? 
Perhaps it is. Of course, there is no unanimity among 
institutional investors or companies about preferred 
governance structures. Just because 70–80% of firms have a 
certain mechanism, or institutions express a preference for 
it, it does not mean that 100% of firms should be forced to 
adopt it, even if it is value enhancing for some. There may be 
valid reasons for why the other 20–30% have chosen not to 
do so, and it is possible that forcing adoption could be value 
destroying. However, there may be no valid reason why the 
other 20–30% have chosen not to adopt the mechanism, and 
employing a particular governance device such as an 
independent compensation committee or an audit committee 
might truly be a best practice. It certainly seems prudent to 
prohibit those whose livelihood or income is determined by a 
company’s executive officers from deciding the compensation 
of those executives or reviewing the financial reporting 
decisions of those officers. Indeed, within the universe of 
mandates Congress could have imposed (and did impose, 
such as the 404 internal control certification requirement in 
Sarbanes-Oxley), requiring any inside and affiliated directors 
to be removed from audit and compensation committees and 
replaced by independent, outside directors is relatively 
inexpensive. Though the practice of fully independent audit 
and compensation committees was not universal prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and stock exchange mandates, 
the practice was sufficiently widespread and consistent with 
the preferences of institutional investors, the purported 
protected class, that Congress could have reasonably 
concluded that blanket mandates in these areas were more 
cost-effective than allowing firms to make individualized 
determinations with respect to mechanism efficacy.257 
In light of these factors, I offer the following. In the 
corporate governance area, there are a number of 
contradictory empirical findings with respect to device 
 
257 There is no evidence that this is what Congress did. Here, I merely 
suggest that it would not be unreasonable for Congress to reach this 
conclusion. 
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efficacy, and this trend shows no signs of abating. Even if 
Congress had carefully reviewed the empirical evidence 
before passing the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank 
governance mandates, what should have been the outcome 
following that review? Should Congress have declined to act 
in the absence of clear evidence? 
Today, we are relatively far removed from the crises that 
plagued the nation before the passing of SOX and Dodd-
Frank, but, unfortunately, we still do not have a consensus 
on what works in internal corporate governance some 
thirteen years after the passage of SOX and five years after 
the passage of Dodd-Frank. If the critics’ argument is that 
Congress should not act in the absence of clear empirical 
evidence, then this necessarily means that regulators will 
not take action until a consensus on what works in corporate 
governance emerges. Dispensing with all mandates and 
leaving it to the market to decide is the goal of some, for 
sure. However, to the extent one believes that capital 
markets failure exists and that regulation to rein in 
managerial overreaching is necessary, then a norm that 
requires waiting for an academic consensus before acting is 
deeply unsatisfying. In this Article, I make the modest claim 
that, if one must act in the face of uncertainty, it would be 
beneficial to adopt a more expansive concept of “valid” 
empirical evidence that includes institutional investor 
preferences. 
2. External Governance 
Though I find some evidence of a mutual fund preference 
for annual director elections, the results of this study suggest 
that there is a high level of institutional tolerance (and, in 
some cases, a seeming preference) for investing in firms with 
low levels of takeover vulnerability. For example, in this 
study, I find a statistically significant relationship between 
public pension fund ownership and low-quality external 
governance, including the presence of a staggered board. 
These results may strike some as puzzling because many 
institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, are 
vocal opponents of antitakeover devices such as poison pills 
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and staggered boards. However, this outcome is consistent 
with researcher Brandon Gold’s findings that suggest 
institutional investor “hypocrisy” when it comes to 
antitakeover mechanisms.258 
Over the past decade, pension funds and mutual funds 
have increasingly come out publicly in opposition to 
antitakeover devices, particularly staggered boards.259 For 
example, the five largest mutual funds, the Council of 
Institutional Investors, and the largest public pension funds 
have adopted formal policies to support annual director 
elections and oppose classified boards.260 In addition, as 
Professor Bebchuk notes, institutional investors, if assessed 
by voting record, firmly support director accountability and 
de-staggering of boards.261 He points to the voting decisions 
of institutional investors in the past three years and notes 
that shareholder proposals for S&P 500 company board 
declassification have received, on average, more than 75% of 
the votes cast in favor.262 This fact must point to, Professor 
Bebchuk argues, the widespread belief among institutional 
investors that devices like staggered boards that facilitate 
management entrenchment are likely to be value decreasing, 
not value enhancing over the long term.263 This institutional 
support is not just from investors with generally short 
investment time horizons, Professor Bebchuk notes, but also 
from public pension funds (e.g., CalPERS, TIAA-CREF), 
investors with long-term horizons because of their need to 
use investments to meet long-term retirement obligations, as 
well as from private investment managers such as 
Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street that focus on 
providing mutual funds that focus on passive, long-term 
investments.264 Professor Bebchuk goes on to argue that this 
consistent pattern of institutional investor support should 
 
258 See Gold, supra note 24, at 56. 
259 Id. at 1. 
260 Id. at 8–9. 
261 Bebchuk, supra note 141, at 1681. 
262 Id. at 1681–82. 
263 Id. at 1681. 
264 Id. at 1682. 
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give those who favor board insulation techniques such as 
staggered boards pause, as they should be reluctant to assert 
that they know what is in the long-term interests of 
investors better than the investors do.265 
This de-staggering trend has occurred in the wake of 
shareholder activism, which often takes the form of 
shareholder proposals to de-classify boards.266 Many public 
companies consequently have de-staggered their boards: 
approximately sixty companies per year de-staggered their 
boards from 2003 to 2010, a substantial increase from the 
average of four firms per year de-staggering between 1987 
and 2002.267 From 2000 to 2012, the number of S&P 500 
companies with classified boards declined by more than 
40%.268 In the 2012 proxy season alone, the Harvard 
Shareholder Rights Project submitted shareholder proposals 
that led to declassification of one-third of the staggered 
boards in the S&P 500.269 On average, 99% of the votes cast 
with respect to these proposals were in favor of 
declassification, which seems to suggest robust investor 
opposition to staggered boards.270 Moreover, firms that were 
subject to declassification proposals de-staggered their 
boards more frequently than firms that were not the targets 
of such proposals.271 The de-staggering trend has been helped 
by the presumption of ISS support for such proposals.272 
Institutional investors’ public opposition to low-quality 
external governance and the subsequent board de-staggering 
trend are at odds with the available evidence on IPO charter 
governance provisions. Charters of IPO firms generally are 
devoid of governance innovations, as companies typically 
adopt the default provisions of the corporate codes of their 
 
265 Id. at 1683. 
266 Gold, supra note 24, at 1. 
267 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1360. 
268 Gold, supra note 24, at 9. 
269 Id. at 9–10. 
270 Id at 10. 
271 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1360. 
272 Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. Corp. L. 887, 
909 (2007). 
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states of incorporation.273 However, staggered boards are an 
exception.274 Despite the vocal opposition to antitakeover 
devices and the recent success of declassification efforts, 
most companies that go public have a staggered board in 
place.275 According to one report, as many as 86% of IPO 
firms (i.e., firms going public) have staggered boards in 
place.276 Another study of firms that went public between 
1997 and 2005 revealed that approximately 64% of them had 
staggered board provisions in their charters.277 Similarly, in 
a review of the governance characteristics of firms at the 
time of IPO for the one hundred largest IPO’s in the U.S. 
between September 2011 and October 2013, Davis Polk 
found that these firms had purportedly low-quality external 
governance.278 For example, among the forty-six non-
controlled firms, 70% had staggered boards and required a 
supermajority vote for amending bylaws, 78% prohibited 
stockholders from acting by written consent, and 98% 
authorized blank check preferred stock (which makes it 
easier for a board to unilaterally put in a poison pill).279 
Despite the pressure from some shareholder groups and 
proxy advisory firms to modify governance practices, 
governance attributes seem to have no meaningful impact on 
the willingness of investors to participate in the offering at 
the IPO stage.280 Indeed, Davis Polk asserts that “IPO 
 
273 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1329. 
274 Id. 
275 Gold, supra note 24, at 1. 
276 Id. at 10. 
277 E-mail from William C. Johnson, Assistant Professor, Sawyer Sch. 
of Bus., Suffolk Univ., to Michael Klausner, Professor, Stanford Law Sch. 
(Jan. 11, 2013), cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1333 n.29 (confirming 
the aggregated percentage of all IPO firms with staggered boards based on 
their dataset). See also Johnson et al., supra note 168. 
278 See Richard J. Sandler, Governance Practices for IPO Companies: 
A Davis Polk Survey, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Feb. 3, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/03/ 
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companies can continue to tailor their governance practices 
to fit their individual preferences.”281 
Researcher Brandon Gold notes that public pension funds 
are among the most vocal opponents of antitakeover devices, 
yet they quietly invest in companies at the IPO stage that 
have all the devices they publicly disparage. Issuers with 
mutual funds and pension funds, which are among the most 
vocal critics of staggered boards, as significant pre-IPO 
shareholders have the strongest takeover defenses in place 
when they go public.282 Gold attributes this inconsistency 
potentially to the separation of voting and investing 
functions in large institutional investors283: non-portfolio 
management personnel (members of the “corporate 
governance” department) are often responsible for voting 
decisions and have no input on the investment decisions of 
the portfolio managers.284 Moreover, for those institutions 
that rely heavily on ISS recommendations for voting, there is 
no coordination whatsoever between ISS (the source of the 
proxy voting recommendations) and the investment 
personnel.285 
Whereas Gold finds this effect with respect to IPO firms, I 
find that it applies to investments in mature companies as 
well. Using a data set of mature NYSE-traded companies, I 
find, consistent with expectations, that mutual fund 
ownership is associated with annual director elections. 
However, public pension fund ownership is not. The pooled 
OLS analysis reveals that public pension funds do not 
eschew investments in companies with staggered boards. 
Indeed, the presence of a staggered board is associated with 
higher levels of public pension fund ownership. Thus, it 
appears that pension funds have relatively high levels of 
investment in firms with classified boards, despite their 
public protestations against the device. 
 
281 Id. 
282 Gold, supra note 24, at 2. 
283 Id. at 56. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
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Some of the previously listed examples of institutional 
activism occurred after my study period ended in 2010, but 
there is no reason to believe that the disconnect between 
public opposition to staggered boards and investment choice 
stems only from a change in time period. The dawn of public 
pension fund activism was in 1985 with the creation of the 
Council of Institutional Investors, an institution devoted to 
fostering collective advocacy for shareholder rights.286 
Activist investors have advocated for the removal of poison 
pills via shareholder proposal submission since 1987,287 and 
their efforts continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s when 
investors sought broader improvements in external and 
internal governance. Activism in the early 2000s seemed to 
gain immense traction in the post-Enron era, when 
management seemed less willing to fight activist efforts 
because of the high cost of ignoring shareholder demands.288 
According to one study of a sample of 620 non-binding 
governance-related shareholder proposals, boards acted upon 
only 16% of shareholder proposals receiving majority 
shareholder vote in 1997; that percentage stood at 40% in 
2004.289 For antitakeover device removal proposals, the 
respective percentages were 18.6% and 40.2%.290 In addition, 
increasing numbers of antitakeover device shareholder 
proposals that received majority shareholder support in 
2002-2004 led many firms to remove their poison pills and 
 
286 Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 56 (2007). 
287 See SHARON MARCIL & PEG O'HARA, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY 
RESEARCH CENTER, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1987 PROXY SEASON 5 (1987). 
288 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of 
Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder 
Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 64 (2010). 
289 Id. at 54, 58 tbl.1. 
290 Id. at 58 tbl.1 (showing that 18.6% represents the rate of 
implementation of majority approved shareholder proposals from 1997–
2001, and 40.2% represents the rate from 2002–2004). 
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de-stagger their boards.291 Consequently, shareholder 
activism is by no means a post-2010 phenomenon. 
One potential explanation for the “hypocrisy” we see 
among public pension funds may simply reflect the difficulty 
such investors face in divesting stocks of firms employing 
antitakeover devices. One pension fund corporate governance 
director I interviewed said s/he had never heard of a pension 
fund selling a stock on the basis of corporate governance 
alone.292 Stocks are sold on account of poor financial 
performance because pension fund managers are trying to 
maximize returns on behalf of their pension beneficiaries. 
However, even if financial analysis does not suggest that a 
stock should be sold, a manager may still comply with her 
fiduciary duties and sell the stock so long as the sale does not 
negatively affect the portfolio.293 The manager needs to be 
 
291 Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in 
the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market 
Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 369 (2007). 
292 Interview with anonymous pension fund corporate governance 
director (July 3, 2014). 
293 See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH INST. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR., 
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND ENDOWMENTS LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
TOBACCO DIVESTMENT 2 n.3 (2001), http://www.bhopal.net/old 
_studentsforbhopal_org/Assets/LegalDivestment.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UQA2-3X98 (quoting Memorandum from Ian D. Lanoff to 
the Cal. State Teachers Ret. Sys.’ Inv. Comm., Regarding Points 
Concerning Investment and Divestment of Plan Assets in Conformity with 
Fiduciary Principles (Mar. 24, 2000)).  
If the analysis whether it is prudent to invest in or hold a 
security yields an uncertain or positive result, a fiduciary 
may lawfully sell the security if it is not imprudent to do 
so. Under such circumstances, a fiduciary may lawfully 
choose to divest, provided that a financial and economic 
analysis performed by investment professionals uncovers a 
number of potential investment opportunities that are 
ostensibly equally advantageous from an economic 
perspective. In this way a fiduciary may lawfully 
implement the divestment plan because it satisfies 
fiduciary requirements of loyalty to plan participants . . . 
and prudence. 
Id. 
DAVIS – FINAL  
82 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
able to replace the divested stock with a comparable security 
that is “equally advantageous from an economic perspective” 
so that the plan upholds its duty of loyalty to plan 
participants.294 It is much easier to divest a company’s stock 
due, say, to politically controversial business relationships 
than it is to divest a stock because it has a staggered board—
staggered boards are simply too prevalent. Almost 12% of the 
firms in the S&P 500,295 40% of the S&P 1500296 and 48% of 
the firms in my sample have classified boards. Even if a 
manager feels strongly about the absence of staggered boards 
as a matter of principle, unless she can tie the presence of 
staggered boards to poor financial performance in her 
portfolio, full-scale divestment of companies with staggered 
boards would be quite difficult.297 
The foregoing provides a potential explanation for why 
pension funds do not divest the stocks of companies with 
staggered boards. What it does not explain is why there is a 
correlation between presence of a staggered board and higher 
levels of public pension fund ownership. The reason for this 
may be related to higher expected long-term performance of 
firms with staggered boards. Recall that Professors Cremers, 
Litov, and Sepe find an association between staggered boards 
and higher long-term firm value,298 so investing in firms with 
staggered boards could be a rational investment choice. 
Relatedly, public pension funds’ apparent preference for 
firms that employ antitakeover devices may also reflect the 
 
294 Id. 
295 See Hoffman, supra note 170. 
296 Becky Yerak, Staggered Boards: Public Companies’ Directors the 
Centerpiece of a Tug of War, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/business/ct-biz-0401-bf-
staggered-boards-20120401_1_board-structure-board-members-board-
terms, archived at http://perma.cc/7LUZ-EDV6. 
297 It is interesting to note that when pension fund corporate 
governance professionals take on issues surrounding corporate 
governance, they typically do not use the threat of selling their stock as 
leverage against corporate management. Instead, they use other means of 
shareholder action such as voting against management on key proposals 
(e.g., say-on-pay). 
298 See supra notes 171–174 and accompanying text. 
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belief that high-quality external governance is costly. As 
discussed above, many internal governance improvements 
(e.g., replacing inside directors with outside directors) are 
relatively inexpensive. So, too, is improving external 
governance (e.g., de-staggering a board) for those firms that 
are not particularly vulnerable to takeovers. However, for 
those companies that are vulnerable to hostile activity (e.g., 
those that are undervalued relative to peers, have excess 
cash or debt capacity, have a shareholder base likely to 
support an unfriendly bid,299 are not too small to be worth 
the expense of a hostile bid300 but not so large as to make 
acquisition infeasible,301 and have viable potential bidders 
that could achieve synergies through a business 
combination),302 de-staggering the board has the potential to 
be game-changing. Reasonable people can and do disagree 
about when and under what circumstances companies should 
allow themselves to be open to hostile attack. This study 
suggests that institutional investors, as a group, are quite 
comfortable with antitakeover devices, perhaps because 
these defenses can protect portfolio companies against 
opportunistic takeover attempts that take advantage of, for 
example, temporary stock price declines.303 This scenario is 
 
299 See 13D Monitor, supra note 211. 
300 See, e.g., In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 
178–79 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
301 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1151 (Del. 1989). 
302 See Michal Barzuza, Noise Adopters in Corporate Governance, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 627, 640–41 (2013). 
303 See, e.g., Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 
86 (Del. Ch. 2011). Air Products waged a 16-month hostile campaign to 
acquire Airgas, but ultimately failed in its attempts to remove Airgas’ 
antitakeover devices. The Airgas board insisted that Air Products was 
undervaluing Airgas and attributed Airgas’ recent share price drop to the 
poor economy. Within less than a year of Air Products dropping its bid, the 
Airgas stock price exceeded Air Product’s “best and final offer” of $70. See 
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s= 
ARG&a=00&b=17&c=2012&d=00&e=17&f=2012&g=d, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G49H-EHLL (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). As of March 23, 
2015, Airgas was trading at $105.31. ARG: Summary for Airgas, Inc. 
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likely to be particularly true with respect to companies at the 
time they go public.304 
What is clear is that there is a positive relationship 
between public pension fund ownership and the presence of 
antitakeover devices. Given this fact, I submit that before we 
criticize legislators or courts for impeding the market for 
corporate control by making it easier for boards to resist 
hostile activity and going against the weight of empirical 
evidence when doing so, one might want to consider the role 
that institutional investor preferences play in the 
perpetuation of antitakeover devices. Despite the claim by 
many academic researchers that exposure to the market for 
corporate control is an unequivocal good, many institutional 
investors, based on their ownership stakes, appear to have a 
different or at least a more nuanced view. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal 
corporate governance is associated with higher levels of 
ownership by institutional investors. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that institutions have greater 
reasons than individual investors to prefer well-governed 
firms, but somewhat surprising given the decidedly mixed 
empirical evidence on the efficacy of internal governance 
mechanisms. The study also finds that higher quality 
external governance is associated, in many cases, with lower 
proportions of ownership by institutional investors. This 
discovery also is a surprising result given empirical evidence 
on the positive relationship between external governance and 
 
Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ARG, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YYN6-VSAT (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
304 In an interview with a director of corporate governance at a 
pension fund, I learned that the issue of staggered boards at the time of 
the IPO was raised at an institutional investor conference s/he attended 
recently. The emerging consensus in the room, I am told, was that there is 
some virtue in giving relatively young companies the space to grow and 
develop without risk of an ill-timed and opportunistic hostile takeover. 
Interview with anonymous pension fund corporate governance director, 
supra note 292.  
DAVIS – FINAL  
No. 1:1] QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 85 
firm performance. After largely dismissing competing 
explanations for these findings, I conclude that institutional 
investors simply prefer internal governance mechanisms and, 
at a minimum, tolerate and may even prefer purportedly 
low-quality external governance. I further make the rather 
modest suggestion that when debating the efficacy of 
governance mechanisms, the preferences of informed, 
sophisticated investors be afforded greater weight than is 
currently the case. 
When accepting the Nobel Prize for Economics, Professor 
Bob Solow remarked: 
[Economists] should try very hard to be scientific 
with a small s. By that I mean only that we should 
think logically and respect fact. . . . Now, I want to 
say something about fact. The austere view is that 
“facts” are just time series of prices and quantities. 
The rest is all hypothesis testing. I have seen a lot of 
those tests. They are almost never convincing, 
primarily because one senses that they have very low 
power against lots of alternatives. There are too 
many ways to explain a bunch of time series. . . . My 
hunch is that we can make progress only by 
enlarging the class of eligible facts to include, say, 
the opinions and casual generalizations of experts 
and market participants, attitudinal surveys, 
institutional regularities, even our own judgments of 
plausibility.305 
These words of wisdom can be applied in the context of 
empirical research surrounding corporate governance. 
Setting corporate law policy is unquestionably a difficult 
endeavor, as there are hundreds of studies reaching 
inconsistent conclusions about what “works” in corporate 
governance. “Enlarging the class of eligible facts” to include 
the reasoned preferences of the protected class may allow us 
 
305 ROBERT SOLOW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES 168–69 (William Breit & 
Barry T. Hirsch eds., 5th ed. 2009), cited in Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N. 
McCloskey, Size Matters: The Standard Error of Regressions in the 
American Economic Review, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 527, 544 (2004). 
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to move closer to making the progress of which Professor 
Solow speaks.   
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APPENDIX 













Mean 0.705   
Std. Dev. 0.232 0.198 0.126 
Minimum 0.000 0.003 -0.105 
Maximum 2.973 1.631 3.124 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,801 1,470 8.028 
Bank  
Ownership 
Mean 0.167   
Std. Dev. 0.081 0.063 0.052 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.148 
Maximum 2.133 0.712 1.947 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,803 1,470 8.029 
 
 
306 Table 1 reports summary data on the variables used in the 
analysis of the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance. Higher values of “ISS INDEX CGQ,” “ISS INDUSTRY CGQ,” 
and “ISS INTERNAL GOVERNANCE SCORE” reflect higher quality 
(primarily or exclusively) internal governance (e.g., board independence). 
Higher values of “E-INDEX” and “G-INDEX” reflect lower quality external 
governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate control). Lower 
values of “ISS EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE SCORE” represent lower 
quality external governance. “ANNUAL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS (i.e., no 
staggered board)” is a measure of high-quality external governance. 
“Observations” in the “Overall” column represents the total number of 
firm-years in the panel. “Observations” in the “Between” column 
represents the number of firms. “T-bar” figures in the “Within” column 
represent the average number of years a firm was observed in the 
applicable variable category. The “Minimums” and “Maximums” reported 
under the “Overall” column represent the range of values for the overall 
sample. Those reported under the “Between” column represent the range 
of values across firms. The “Minimums” and “Maximums” reported under 
the “Within” column represent the range of deviations from each 
individual firm’s average for the applicable variable, which may result in 
negative values. 
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Mean 0.038   
Std. Dev. 0.041 0.034 0.024 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.452 
Maximum 0.695 0.646 0.305 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Mean 0.452   
Std. Dev. 0.177 0.150 0.096 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.180 
Maximum 1.588 1.063 1.256 
Observations/ 
T-bar 





Mean 0.007   
Std. Dev. 0.033 0.030 0.012 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.259 
Maximum 0.913 0.902 0.442 
Observations/ 
T-bar 





Mean 0.025   
Std. Dev. 0.015 0.012 0.009 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.050 
Maximum 0.188 0.162 0.148 
Observations/ 
T-bar 





Mean  0.002   
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.005 0.005 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.063 
Maximum 0.149 0.131 0.100 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,803 1,470 8.029 
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Mean 0.029   
Std. Dev. 0.037 0.025 0.027 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.180 
Maximum 0.729 0.251 0.673 
Observations/ 
T-bar 









Mean 56.651   
Std. Dev. 28.398 21.544 18.681 
Minimum 0.100 1.739 -23.935 
Maximum 100.000 99.182 122.091 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Mean 70.006   
Std. Dev. 24.705 19.293 15.880 
Minimum 0.170 3.743 -8.861 
Maximum 100.000 99.138 130.762 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
10,437 1,348 7.743 
ISS 
Internal 
Mean 22.762   
Std. Dev. 7.185 2.691 6.714 
Minimum 4.000 11.000 -0.238 
Maximum 39.000 31.000 36.429 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
10,437 1,348 7.743 
E-Index Mean 2.736   
 Std. Dev. 1.227 1.022 0.732 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.764 
Maximum 6.000 6.000 5.861 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
8,080 1,210 6.678 
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Overall Between Within 
G-Index Mean 9.437   
Std. Dev. 2.568 2.533 0.424 
Minimum 2.000 2.000 4.771 
Maximum 18.000 18.000 12.437 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
5,991 1,143 5.241 
ISS  
External 
Mean 7.574   
Std. Dev. 2.8810 2.072 2.023 
Minimum 0.000 1.667 -2.301 
Maximum 16.000 14.000 14.240 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Mean 0.444   
Std. Dev. 0.497 0.468 0.169 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.445 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.333 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Overall Between Within 
Delaware 
Incorp. 
Mean 0.559   
Std. Dev. 0.497 0.492 0.064 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.219 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.226 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Mean 0.012   
Std. Dev. 0.107 0.049 0.097 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.655 
Maximum 1.000 0.667 0.900 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,804 1,470 8.030 
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Mean 8,033.458   
Std. Dev. 23,401.94 21,240.95 7,357.087 
Minimum 1.756 5.910 -186,458.800 
Maximum 452,505.300 343,599.000 145,098.700 
Observations/ 
T-bar 





   
Mean 1,710,659.000   
Std. Dev. 7,064,189.000 4,304,473.000 5,522,876.000 
Minimum 3,313.834 11,652.060 -81,800,000.000 
Maximum 499,000,000.000 96,400,000.000 404,000,000.000 
Observations/ 
T-bar 





covering at a 
point in time) 
Mean 9.356   
Std. Dev. 6.808 6.318 2.501 
Minimum 1.000 1.000 -14.444 
Maximum 42.000 32.556 27.356 
Observations/ 
T-bar 








Mean 314.685   
Std. Dev. 300.923 266.942 130.130 
Minimum 1.000 2.000 -565.565 
Maximum 2,533.000 1,842.222 1,478.560 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,327 1,445 7.839 
Industry 
Diversity 
(1 = operates 
in more than 
two 
industries) 
Mean 0.580   
Std. Dev. 0.494 0.495 0.000 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.580 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 0.580 
Observations/ 
T-bar 




Mean 173.559   
Std. Dev. 525.034 469.512 201.466 
Minimum 0.000 0.111 -4,162.108 
Maximum 17,241 9,237.667 8,176.892 
Observations/
T-bar 
11,799 1,469 8.032 
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Overall Between Within 
Age  
(in months) 
Mean 296.577   
Std. Dev. 242.058 238.512 28.0876 















Mean 0.103   
Std. Dev. 0.071 0.039 0.060 













Mean 0.149   
Std. Dev. 2.829 0.978 2.644 













Mean 0.053   
Std. Dev. 0.748 0.276 0.696 












Total Assets  
(in integers) 
Mean 29.280   
Std. Dev. 25.450 24.583 6.826 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -48.485 
Maximum 99.788 92.901 67.415 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
9,151 1,115 8.207 
 
DAVIS – FINAL  
No. 1:1] QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93 




Overall Between Within 
Stock Price Mean 33.343   
Std. Dev. 34.151 29.153 16.051 













Mean 9.687   
Std. Dev. 99.340 32.369  93.507 














Mean 50.328   
Std. Dev. 93.862 53.224 77.740 












Mean 0.269   
Std. Dev. 0.444 0.415 0.138 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -0.620 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.158 
Observations/ 
T-bar 
11,804 1,470 8.030 
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CORRELATION MATRIX (CONT.) 
 
 
307 Table 2 reports pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables 
used in the analysis of the relationship between institutional ownership 
and corporate governance. *, †, and ‡ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. Higher values of “ISS Index CGQ,” “ISS 
Industry CGQ,” and “ISS Internal Governance Score” reflect higher quality 
(primarily or exclusively internal governance (e.g., board independence). 
Higher values of “E-Index” and “G-Index” reflect lower quality external 
governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate control). Lower 
values of “ISS External Governance Score” represent lower quality 
external governance. “Annual director elections (i.e., no staggered board)” 
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APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT FACTORS308 
 
A. Board Issues  
 
1. At least two-thirds of the directors on the board 
should be independent.  
2. The nominating committee of the board should be 
composed solely of independent directors.  
3. The compensation committee of the board should be 
composed solely of independent directors.  
4. The functions of a governance committee should be 
handled by a committee of the board, typically the 
nominating committee or the governance committee. 
5. Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an 
annual basis. [No staggered board.]  
6. Boards should not have fewer than 6 members or 
more than 15 members.   
7. Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes 
to expand or contract the size of the board.  
8. Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their 
votes for directors.   
9. In addition to serving on his own company’s board, 
the CEO should not serve on more than two other 
boards of public companies.  
10. Outside directorships should be limited to service on 
 the boards of five or fewer public companies. (Note: 
Raw data indicates number is four boards, not five.) 
11. Former CEOs should not serve on the board of 
directors.  
12. The positions of chairman and CEO should be 
separated or a lead director should be specified. 
13. Board guidelines should be published in the proxy on 
an annual basis. 
 
308 ISS BEST PRACTICES USER GUIDE & GLOSSARY (2003). This list 
ignores combination factors. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–
2010. Items in bold (Nos. 23–27, 33–34, 60) are omitted from the analysis 
of individual governance factors for the reasons described above. 
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14. Management should take action on all shareholder 
proposals supported by a majority vote within 12 
months of the shareholders’ meeting. 
15. Directors should attend at least 75% of board 
meetings. 
16. Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote 
on all directors selected to fill vacancies.  
17. CEOs should not be the subject of transactions that 





18. The audit committee of the board should be composed 
solely of independent directors. 
19. The company should disclose its policy with respect to 
the rotation of auditors.  
20. Consulting fees (audit-related and other) should be 
less than audit fees. 
21. Shareholders should be permitted to ratify 




22. No poison pill or shareholder approved poison pill. 
23. [Omit because combined no poison pill with 
shareholder approved poison pill because it is 
not possible to get points in both categories.] 
24. If there is a poison pill, it should have a three-
year independent director evaluation. [Omit 
because only applies to subset of companies 
with poison pills] 
25. If there is a poison pill, it should have a sunset 
provision. [Omit because only applies to subset 
of companies with poison pills] 
26. If there is a poison pill, it should have a 
qualified offer clause. [Omit because only 
applies to subset of companies with poison pills] 
DAVIS – FINAL  
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27. If there is a poison pill, it should have a trigger 
threshold of 20 percent or more. [Omit because 
only applies to subset of companies with poison 
pills] 
28. A simple majority vote should be required to amend 
the charter/bylaws. 
29. A simple majority vote should be required to approve 
mergers or business combinations 
30. Shareholders should be permitted to act by written 
consent. 
31. Shareholders should be permitted to call special 
meetings. 
32. Management should not be permitted to amend the 
bylaws without shareholder approval.  
33. [Omit because discrepancy between raw data 
(“Single class of stock, with or without blank 
check preferred”) and ISS standard which 
states: Common stock entitled to one vote per 
share and declawed preferred stock are viewed 
favorably.]  
 
D. Antitakeover Provisions  
 
33. The company is incorporated in a state with no 
antitakeover statutes. [Omit because of 
potential for overlap with 35-40] 
34. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
control share acquisition statute or has opted out. 
35. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
control share cash out statute or has opted out. 
36. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
freezeout statute or has opted out. 
37. The company is incorporated in a state without a fair 
price provision statute or has opted out. 
38. The company is not incorporated in a state with a 
stakeholder constituency statute or has opted out.  
39. The company is not incorporated in a state with a 
poison pill endorsement statute.   
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E. Executive and Director Compensation 
 
40. The cost of the company’s stock-based incentive plans 
is not more than ISS’ cap.  
41. Options have not been repriced in the past [three 
years] without prior shareholder approval. 
42. Company policy prohibits option repricing without 
prior shareholder approval. 
43. All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to 
shareholders for approval.  
44. No interlocking directors should serve on the 
Compensation Committee. 
45. Directors should receive a portion of their 
compensation in the form of stock. 
46. Non-Employee directors should not participate in 
pension plans. 
47. The company has adopted FAS 123 and expenses 
options. 
48. The company’s burn rate is excessive where average 
annual option grants exceed three percent of 
outstanding shares over the past three years.  
49. New loan programs under stock option plans are 
prohibited. 
   
F. Progressive Practices 
 
50. Directors are subject to mandatory retirement age or 
term limits 
51. A policy of conducting regular board performance 
reviews should be disclosed. 
52. A policy specifying that directors should meet without 
the CEO should be disclosed.  
53. A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in 
place.  
54. A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors 
should be disclosed. 
55. A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in 
job status should be disclosed.  
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G. Ownership 
 
56. Each director [with more than one year of service] 
owns stock in the company. 
57. Executives should be subject to stock ownership 
guidelines. 
58. Directors should be subject to stock ownership 
guidelines. 
59. Officers and directors should have a significant 
ownership position in their company’s stock. 
[Omit because no percentage specified by ISS] 
  
H.  Director Education 
 
60. All board members should participate in “ISS 
accredited” director education programs.  
 
APPENDIX B: ISS INTERNAL FACTORS309 
 
A. Board Issues  
 
1. At least two-thirds of the directors on the board 
should be independent.  
2. The nominating committee of the board should be 
composed solely of independent directors.  
3. The compensation committee of the board should be 
composed solely of independent directors.  
4. The functions of a governance committee should be 
handled by a committee of the board, typically the 
nominating committee or the governance committee. 
5. Boards should not have fewer than 6 members or 
more than 15 members.    
6. Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their 
votes for directors.   
 
309  If ISS data indicate company’s disclosures do not provide the 
information, firm gets no points under my analysis. This is a rare 
occurrence. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–2010. Also, item 
in bold (No. 60) is omitted from the analysis of individual governance 
factors for the reason described above. 
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8. In addition to serving on his own company’s board, 
the CEO should not serve on more than two other 
boards of public companies.  
9. Outside directorships should be limited to service on 
the boards of five or fewer public companies. (Note: 
Raw data indicates number is four boards, not five.) 
10. Former CEOs should not serve on the board of 
directors.  
11. The positions of chairman and CEO should be 
separated or a lead director should be specified. 
12. Board guidelines should be published in the proxy on 
an annual basis. 
13. Management should take action on all shareholder 
proposals supported by a majority vote within 12 
months of the shareholders’ meeting. 
14. Directors should attend at least 75% of board 
meetings. 
15. CEOs should not be the subject of transactions that 





18. The audit committee of the board should be composed 
solely of independent directors. 
19. The company should disclose its policy with respect to 
the rotation of auditors.  
20. Consulting fees (audit-related and other) should be 
less than audit fees. 
21. Shareholders should be permitted to ratify 
management’s selection of auditors each year.  
  
C. Executive and Director Compensation 
 
41. The cost of the company’s stock-based incentive plans 
is not more than ISS’ cap.  
42. Options have not been repriced in the past [three 
years] without prior shareholder approval. 
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43. Company policy prohibits option repricing without 
prior shareholder approval. 
44. All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to 
shareholders for approval.  
45. No interlocking directors should serve on the 
Compensation Committee. 
46. Directors should receive a portion of their 
compensation in the form of stock. 
47. Non-employee directors should not participate in 
pension plans. 
48. The company has adopted FAS 123 and expenses 
options. 
49. The company’s burn rate is excessive where average 
annual option grants exceed three percent of 
outstanding shares over the past three years.  
50. New loan programs under stock option plans are 
prohibited. 
   
D. Progressive Practices 
 
51. Directors are subject to mandatory retirement age or 
term limits 
52. A policy of conducting regular board performance 
reviews should be disclosed. 
53. A policy specifying that directors should meet without 
the CEO should be disclosed.  
54. A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in 
place.  
55. A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors 
should be disclosed. 
56. A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in 




57. Each director [with more than one year of service] 
owns stock in the company. 
58. Executives should be subject to stock ownership 
guidelines. 
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59. Directors should be subject to stock ownership 
guidelines. 
60. Officers and directors should have a significant 
ownership position in their company’s stock. 
[Omit because no percentage specified by ISS] 
  
F. Director Education 
 
61. All board members should participate in “ISS 
accredited” director education programs. 
  
APPENDIX C: ENTRENCHMENT INDEX 
 
The Entrenchment Index is based on the following six 
provisions: 
 
1. Staggered (classified) boards 
2. Limits on shareholder bylaw amendments 
3. Supermajority voting requirements for mergers  
4. Supermajority voting requirements for charter 
amendments  
5. Poison pills 
6. Golden parachutes 
 




1. Blank Check 
2. Classified Board 
3. Special Meeting 




310  The G-Index is based on 28 provisions—22 firm-level 
characteristics and 6 state laws, 4 of which are analogous to 4 of the firm-
level characteristics, for a net 24 provisions. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & 
Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 
107 (2003). 
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B. Protection 
 
1. Compensation Plans 
2. Contracts 









3. Cumulative Voting 
4. Secret Ballot 
5. Supermajority 





2. Directors’ Duties 
3. Fair Price 
4. Pension Parachutes 
5. Poison Pill 




1. Antigreenmail Law 
2. Business Combination Law 
3. Cash-out Law 
4. Directors’ Duties Law 
5. Fair Price Law 
6. Control Share Acquisition Law 
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APPENDIX E: ISS EXTERNAL FACTORS311 
  
A. Board Issues 
 
5. Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an 
annual basis [No staggered board].  
7. Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes 
to expand or contract the size of the board.  
16. Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote 




22. No poison pill or shareholder approved poison pill  
23. [Omit because combined no poison pill with 
shareholder approved poison pill because it is 
not possible to get points in both categories.] 
24. If there is a poison pill, it should have a three-
year independent director evaluation. [Omit 
because only applies to subset of companies 
with poison pills] 
25. If there is a poison pill, it should have a sunset 
provision. [Omit because only applies to subset 
of companies with poison pills] 
26. If there is a poison pill, it should have a 
qualified offer clause. [Omit because only 
applies to subset of companies with poison pills] 
27. If there is a poison pill, it should have a trigger 
threshold of 20 percent or more. [Omit because 
only applies to subset of companies with poison 
pills] 
28. A simple majority vote should be required to amend 
the charter/bylaws. 
 
311  If ISS data indicate company’s disclosures do not provide the 
information, firm gets no points under my analysis. This is a rare 
occurrence. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–2010. Also, items 
in bold (Nos. 23–27, 33–34) are omitted from the analysis of individual 
governance factors for the reason described above. 
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29. A simple majority vote should be required to approve 
mergers or business combinations 
30. Shareholders should be permitted to act by written 
consent. 
31. Shareholders should be permitted to call special 
meetings.  
32. Management should not be permitted to amend the 
bylaws without shareholder approval.  
33. [Omit because discrepancy between raw data 
(“Single class of stock, with or without blank 
check preferred”) and ISS standard which 
states: Common stock entitled to one vote per 
share and declawed preferred stock are viewed 
favorably.] 
  
C. Antitakeover Provisions 
 
34. The company is incorporated in a state with no 
antitakeover statutes. [Omit because of 
potential for overlap with 35-40] 
35. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
control share acquisition statute or has opted out. 
36. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
control share cash out statute or has opted out. 
37. The company is incorporated in a state without a 
freezeout statute or has opted out. 
38. The company is incorporated in a state without a fair 
price provision statute or has opted out. 
39. The company is not incorporated in a state with a 
stakeholder constituency statute or has opted out.  
40. The company is not incorporated in a state with a 
poison pill endorsement statute.  
 
 
